Inclusive growth: Improving microfinance regulation to support growth and innovation in microenterprise by Smith, Alastair
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inclusive Growth: Improving 
Microfinance Regulation to Support 
Growth and Innovation in Micro-
enterprise  
 
 
 
 
The Republic of Kenya Background Country Report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Alastair Michael Smith 
Informal Economic Observatory 
2 
 
Contents 
Disclaimer................................................................................................................................................ 4 
Acronyms ................................................................................................................................................ 4 
Exchange Rates ....................................................................................................................................... 4 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 6 
Current Macro Economic Context of Kenya ........................................................................................... 6 
Overview of Contemporary Banking Sector in Kenya ............................................................................. 8 
Structural Drivers for Microfinance in Kenya ......................................................................................... 8 
Historical Development of Microcredit in Kenya .................................................................................. 13 
1. The Informal Financial Sub-system ............................................................................................ 13 
2. The Quasi-Formal Financial Subsystem ..................................................................................... 13 
3. The Formal, Subsidised Credit System ...................................................................................... 15 
4. The Formal, Non-Subsidised Credit System .............................................................................. 16 
Overall Structure of the Microfinance in Kenya (excluding SACCOS) .................................................... 22 
Size of loans by Type of Lender ..................................................................................................... 22 
Gender Balance of Loan Access .................................................................................................... 23 
Branches and Geographical Distribution ...................................................................................... 23 
Financial Structure ........................................................................................................................ 23 
Loan Use ........................................................................................................................................ 24 
Lending Methodologies ................................................................................................................ 24 
Loan Costs to Consumers .............................................................................................................. 24 
Training ......................................................................................................................................... 24 
Policy and Regulation for Microfinance in Kenya ................................................................................. 24 
Regulation of Microfinance Institutions ........................................................................................... 25 
Regulation of SACCOS ....................................................................................................................... 30 
Performance of Microfinance in Kenya ................................................................................................ 32 
Outreach ........................................................................................................................................... 32 
Sustainability of MF .......................................................................................................................... 33 
Issues with Microfinance Identified by the Existing Literature ........................................................ 35 
Microcredit is not enough ............................................................................................................. 35 
Access to Microcredit is Geographically Concentrated ................................................................ 35 
Interest Rates Remain High........................................................................................................... 36 
Adjustment to New Licensing Slow ............................................................................................... 36 
Consumer Protection and Over-Indebtedness ............................................................................. 37 
Consumer Protection in the Microfinance Sector ............................................................................ 37 
Credit Information ............................................................................................................................ 38 
3 
 
Mobile Banking ..................................................................................................................................... 39 
Limitations and Issues with Mobile Technology ............................................................................... 44 
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 46 
 
  
4 
 
Disclaimer 
 
The current document should be considered work in progress, and only aims to provide the most 
accurate and complete account at the time of writing. The profile should not be considered 
exhaustive and has not been reviewed by country experts or peer reviewed. If you notice a gap or 
error in any of the profiles, we would very much appreciate your comments for improvement. All 
financial data stated in this report are nominal values, and therefore, the impact of inflation should 
be taken into account of corrected for. 
 
Acronyms 
 
Acronym Meaning 
  
AMFI Association of Microfinance Institutions 
ASCAs Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations 
ATM(s) Automated Teller Machine(s) 
CBK Central Bank of Kenya 
COSALO Community Savings and Loans 
CRB Credit Reference Bureau 
DT-MFI(s) Deposit Taking Microfinance Institution(s) 
DTS Deposit Taking SACCOS 
ICDC Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation 
KIE Kenya Industrial Estates 
KShs Kenyan Shillings 
KTDC Kenya Tourist Development Corporation 
MFI  Micro-Finance Institution 
NA Not Applicable 
NBFl(s) Non-Bank Financial Institution(s) 
NDT-S Non-Deposit Taking SACCOS 
ROSCAs Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
PAR 30 Portfolio At Risk over 30 days 
SACCOS Savings and Credit Co-operative Societies 
UA (Data) Unavailable 
VAT Value Added Tax 
VSLA Village Savings and Loans Associations 
 
Exchange Rates 
 
Kenya Shillings (KSh) United States Dollars (USD) 
100 1.11 
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Introduction 
 
Although the development of small scale and informal enterprises in the Kenyan economy is 
constrained by a myriad of factors, the availability of credit does offer an important input where it is 
available on appropriate terms (Kariuki 1995).  
According to the Central Bank of Kenya, “Microfinance is the provision of a wide range of financial 
services and products ranging from savings credit facilities, money transfer and micro insurance to 
the economically active poor, low-income households and Small and Micro Scale Enterprises (SMEs) 
in both rural and urban areas, using innovative delivery methodologies and channels” (Central Bank 
of Kenya 2007, p. 17). SMEs are particularly identified as important given that the “best estimates 
peg the MSME market [in Kenya] at approximately 7.5 million enterprises. They contribute 
approximately 44% to the Kenyan GDP (in 2008, up from estimates of 13.8% in 1993), 80% of the 
country’s total employment and 92% of all new jobs” (FSD Kenya 2010a, p. 1). While this report will 
discuss microfinance as a broad sector throughout, the focus is on understanding microcredit. 
 
This Background Country Report first summarises the contemporary macroeconomic context of 
Kenya; discusses the drivers for the emergence of microcredit in the country; then provides an 
overview of the sector, including specific discussion of the regulatory history and framework for 
microcredit. The role of technology and particularly mobile phones in contemporary microcredit 
provision is addressed. 
 
Current Macro Economic Context of Kenya 
 
Population (in millions) 43.2  Corruption Perception Index country rank 139  
Population % urban  24  Account at a formal financial institution  (% age 
15+) 42  
Gross domestic product per capita   
865 (current US$) 
Bank branches/100,000 people 5.2  
 
Human Development Index ranking 145  
 
ATMs/100,000 people 9.5  
 
Adult literacy rate (%) 87 (2010)  SIM penetration (%)70  
Table 1: Overview of Economic and Financial  Indicators for Kenya (Zimmerman et al. 2014, p. 2) 
According to the Central Bank of Kenya (2013, p. 24), the country’s economy grew by 4.7 percent in 
2013, compared with 4.6 percent in 2012 and 4.4 percent in 2011. Growth was mainly driven by the 
energy, financial services and trade sectors; and individual contributions can be seen in Table 2. 
Sector Contribution Sector Contribution 
Agriculture and 
Forestry 
20.6 percent 
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade 
11.5 percent 
Transport and 
Communication 
12.6 percent Manufacturing 9.5 percent 
Table 2: Sectoral Contribution of Kenyan GDP 2013 
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Inflation rose in 2013 from 3.67 percent in January to 7.15 percent in December 2013 but remained 
within the CBK target range of 2.5% - 7.5%. This acceleration was largely attributed to price rises in 
food, increased from 2.40 percent to 10.41 percent on account of adverse weather conditions in the 
last quarter of 2013, and implementation of Value Added Tax (VAT) in September 2013. The non-
food, non-fuel inflation (NFNF) registered marginal increase from 4.53 percent in January 2013 to 
4.71 percent in December 2013 (Central Bank of Kenya 2013, p. 24). 
Historically, the Kenyan domestic economy has been tied to international markets for the export of 
coffee and import of oil, upon which it is reliant for domestic fuel  consumption (Mosley 1986). In 
the late 1970s, price drops in the former and rises in the latter forced the country to turn to 
international financial institutions and donors for support. This resulted in a process of liberalisation 
across the economy.  
Despite inflation, overall interest rates in Kenya have recently declined1 
Rate 2012 2013 
The Central Bank Rate (CBR) 11.0 percent (December) 8.5 percent (May) 
Interbank rate 13.64 (average) 8.41 (average) 
Repo-rate 12.61 percent (average) 8.07 percent (average) 
Commercial banks’ lending 18.13 percent  (Jan 2013) 16.99 percent (December 2013) 
Bank deposits 6.51 percent (Jan 2013) 6.65 percent (December 2013) 
Interest rate spread 11.62 percent (Jan 2013) 10.34 percent (December 2013) 
Table 3: Key Interest Rates (Central Bank of Kenya 2013, p. 24 & 26).  
 
  
                                                          
1
 It is relevant to note that the central bank does not record and publish interest rates of microfinance 
institutions. Other third party organisations have stated to make this data available however, offering a 
summary of reported interest rates by institutions from countries across the globe (MF Transparency 2015).  
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Overview of Contemporary Banking Sector in Kenya 
 
As can be seen in Image 1, at 
the end of 2013, the banking 
sector in Kenya was composed 
of the Central Bank of Kenya (as 
the regulatory authority), 
overseeing 44 banking 
institutions. Out of these, 30 
were locally owned banks, 3 
had publically held shares 
(Consolidated Bank of Kenya 
77.8%, Development Bank of 
Kenya 100% and National Bank 
of Kenya 70.6%) and 27 were 
privately owned. 14 banks were 
foreign owned. There was also 
one locally owned mortgage 
finance company - MFC). In 
addition to full commercial 
banks, there were nine 
registered Microfinance Banks 
(MFBs) or Deposit Taking 
Microfinance Institutions (DT-MFIs), 2 Credit Reference Bureaus (CRBs) and 101 forex bureaus. The 9 
MFBs, 2 CRBs and 101 forex bureaus were privately owned. The foreign owned financial institutions 
comprised 10 locally incorporated foreign banks and 4 branches of foreign incorporated banks 
(Central Bank of Kenya 2013, p. 1). Nationally there were 2,487 bank branches (Central Bank of 
Kenya 2013, p. 6 & 8).  
 
Structural Drivers for Microfinance in Kenya 
 
The need for microfinance in Kenya has been driven by a series of interrelated constraints on the 
development of a banking and finance sector. These key constraints have been: the structure and 
composition of the Kenyan banking and finance sector; a lack of the appropriate regulation and 
governance required for quality improvements in banking and finance; general macro-economic 
conditions; and the conservative commercial business practices of profit focused banking 
institutions.  
Before independence (1963 with the republic declared in 1964), Kenya had a banking sector 
established as part of the wider economic colonisation of the country, and therefore, not geared to 
provided credit to the majority of Kenyans. At the end of colonial rule there were four British owned 
banks and three Non-Banking Financial Institution (NBFI), two of which were subsidiaries of the 
formal banks (Central Bank of Kenya 1998, p. 13). These banks were subject to the Summary of 
Banking Arrangements, which eliminated competition in lending rates and charges (Leys 1975, p. 
 
Image 1: Structure of Banking Sector (Central Bank of Kenya 
2013, p. 1) 
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134). Prior to the establishment of the Central Bank of Kenya in 1966, matters relating to monetary 
management were handled by the East African Currency Board which also served Uganda and 
Tanzania (Kinyua 2000). Following independence, the Kenya government bought controlling shares 
in all national banking institutions under a nationalistic policy to expand the availability of credit to 
African Kenyans; although they insisted that they expected them to operate on a commercial basis 
(Leys 1975, pp. 133-135). The sector also began to expand and two new domestic banks were 
established in 1964 under the Banking Act of the same year: the Cooperative Bank of Kenya, which 
was opened to provide banking services to members of the cooperative moment2, and the wholly 
government owned National Bank of Kenya both opened in 1968. One commercial bank separated 
into two in 1971 and the Commercial Bank of Kenya was nationalised (Leys 1975, p. 157). There was 
also growth of Non-Banking Financial Institutions: existing NBFI operations were newly licenced and 
others emerged to leave seven by the end of 1977, and 35 by 1983 (Central Bank of Kenya 1998, p. 
13). 
Despite this initial growth in the banking and finance sector, the political interest in expanding credit 
was not matched with prudent regulation to maintain quality. The newly nationalised Commercial 
Bank of Kenya expanded lending by 225% between January and September 1971 (Leys 1975, p. 157). 
Between September 1970 and January 1971, commercial banks as a whole increased credit 
availability to domestic traders by £6.5 million and to households by £6.3 million (Leys 1975, p. 157). 
Overall, credit to the private sector rose by 36.5 percent in 1970 (Kinyua 2000). Unfortunately, in the 
absence of appropriate governance, large non-performing loans were made to Directors and their 
associates which greatly weakened asset quality (Central Bank of Kenya 1998, pp. 14-15). As a result, 
a good number of bank, and non-bank-financial-intuition failed in the 1980s, and Central Bank of 
Kenya was required to step in to restructure institutions in order prevent their collapse (Central Bank 
of Kenya 1998, p. 13).  
In response to the problems of the banking sector a two part strategy was implemented—to some 
degree influenced by external conditionality. As for many African countries in the early 1970, the 
sharp rise in the global oil prices were compounded by wider recession that reduced markets for 
exports. As a result of this situation, the Kenyan Government were forced to seek support from 
international financial institutions (Mosley 1986). The conditions attached to this support required 
the application of market governance to the financial sector via liberalisation, and increased and 
improved direct regulation (See section on Regulation below). Liberalisation of interest rates is 
considered to increase the availability of credit as it allows banks to charge rates necessary to service 
high cost of provision and offset risks associated with providing credit to wider interests (Kariuki 
1995, p. 15). However, in the early years of reform, governance frameworks often lacked coherence. 
Initially, regulation of NBFI was less stringent, as for example these were not subject to interest rate 
controls. Therefore, while the number of banks remained limited, there was a proliferation of NBFI 
which continued to operate outside appropriate governance frameworks. 
 
Year Banks Other Non- Mortgage or Total Licenced Number of 
                                                          
2
 Given the bank was unable to comply with capital requirements specified under the Banking Act, it was given 
special dispensation and a grace period to meet these obligations. The Bank registered as a finance company – 
the Co-operative Finance Limited – in 1977 to conduct the business of a financial institution, and opened to 
the public in 1993. Only in 1994 did the Co-operative Bank become a full commercial bank (Co-Operative Bank 
2014). 
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bank financial 
institutions 
(NBFIs) 
Building 
Societies 
Institutions Deposit 
Taking 
MFI 
Branches 
1964 3 3 No stats 6 Na No stats 
1968 5 3 No stats 7 Na No stats 
1977 6 7 No stats 13 Na No stats 
1983 6 35 No stats 41 Na No stats 
1994 33 52 No stats 85 Na 489 
1995 No Data No Data No Data No Data Na 568 
1996 50 21 Not stated 71 Na 588 
1997 53 17 6 74 Na 670 
1998 53 14 6 73 Na 692 
1999 53 8 6 67 Na 530 
2000 49 5 6 60 Na 465 
2001 46 3 6 55 Na 494 
2002 45 3 6 54 Na 486 
2003 45 3 6 52 Na 512 
2004 44 2 5 51 Na 532 
2005 49 1 3 53 Na No Stats 
2006 41 1 3 45 Na 575 
2007 42 1 2 45 Na 740 
2008 43 0 2 45 Na 887 
2009 44 0 2 46 1 996 
2010 43 0 1 44 5 1,063 
2011 43 0 1 44 6 1,161 
2012 43 0 1 44 8 1,272 
2013 43 0 1 44 9 1,342 
2014 43 0 0 44 UA UA 
Table 4: Numbers of Banking Institutions (Compiled by author from various sources: Central Bank of 
Kenya 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2013, 2014b; FSD Kenya 2012) 
During the 1960s and 1970s the Kenyan Government’s monetary policy remained characterised by  
strong state intervention, as it administered interest rates through a regime of fixing minimum 
savings rates for all deposit-accepting institutions and minimum lending rates for commercial banks, 
non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) and building societies (Kariuki 1995; Ngugi 2001, p. 296). The 
intention was to ensure low interest rates to encourage investment and protect small borrowers. 
Consequently, real interest rates were negative during the 1970s (Kariuki 1995, p. 15). However, the 
CBK struggled to open up credit supply for domestic private sector given the constraints of money 
management, a fixed exchange rate and expansionist government fiscal policies (Kinyua 2000). “By 
1985 it had become clear to the Kenya government that the economic difficulties the country faced 
were more structural in nature and, as such, in addition to the stabilization measures, it called for 
far-reaching structural reforms in the economy” (Kinyua 2000). As a result, interest rates were fully 
liberalised in July 1991 (Ngugi 2001, p. 297). The intention was to expand credit availability so that 
biases against lending to small business were eliminated (Kariuki 1995, p. 16). Rates immediately and 
significantly increased although inflation continued to rise. Despite high rates, some evidence 
suggests that more small and medium businesses borrowed money in the early 1990s than they did 
in the 1970s (Kariuki 1995). However, higher interest rates also had the effect of increasing non-
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performing assets and triggered bank failures: with 17 more failing banks requiring liquidated 
between 1993 and 1994, (Central Bank of Kenya 1998, p. 13). 
Another reason for the failure of monetary policy was reliance on domestic credit guidelines as a 
way of containing monetary expansion. However, these did not apply to the non-bank financial 
institutions (NBFIs) that therefore proliferated in the late 1970s and early1980s. As a means to 
counter this, NBFIs were encouraged to become banks through mergers, acquisitions and sole 
conversions (Central Bank of Kenya 1998, p. 13). Amendments to the Banking Act (1994) finally 
ensured NBFI also complied with monetary policies issues by the Central Bank. There was a 
moratorium on the licencing of new banking institutions in POSSIBLY BEFORE UNTIL 1997 (Central 
Bank of Kenya 1998, p. 4). This situation, led to a significant change in the banking and finance 
structure, with a rise in the number of banks and a corresponding fall in the number of NBFIs. 
Despite the restructuring, some of the NBFls were ill prepared for commercial banking; many were 
insufficiently capitalised and therefore collapsed. To address this issue, the Banking Act was 
amended in 1997 and 1999 to require banks to raise their paid-up capital from KShs 75 million to 
KShs 200 million and then KShs 500 million for banks and KShs 375 million for NBFls by end of 2005. 
This policy was expected to incentivise many of the small and medium size banks to merge and 
become more competitive; and in 1999, eight institutions were approved for merger into four 
(Central Bank of Kenya 1999, p. 7). Following liberalisation, The Cooperative Bank of Kenya moved 
away from only working with members of the cooperative movement, to become a universal 
commercial bank (Bell et al. 2002). 
Period 
Nominal Lending 
Rates 
Interest Rate Spread Real Interest Rates 
1971 9 5.5 20.07 
1972 9 5.5 7.7 
1973 9 5.5 -1.09 
1974 9.5 5.19 -5.64 
1975 10 4.87 -1.64 
1976 10 4.87 -7.49 
1977 10 4.87 -5.9 
1978 10 4.87 6.71 
1979 10 4.87 4.13 
1980 10.58 4.83 0.94 
1981 12.42 3.57 1.41 
1982 14.5 2.3 2.61 
1983 15.83 2.56 3.57 
1984 14.42 2.65 3.84 
1985 14 2.75 5.26 
1986 14 2.75 4.86 
1987 14 3.69 8.16 
1988 15 4.67 8.03 
1989 17.25 5.25 6.82 
1990 18.75 5.08 7.33 
1991 19 UA 5.75 
1992 21.07 UA 1.83 
1993 29.99 UA 3.41 
1994 36.24 UA 16.43 
1995 28.8 15.2 15.8 
1996 33.79 16.2 -5.78 
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1997 30.25 13.52 16.88 
1998 29.49 11.09 21.1 
1999 22.38 12.83 17.45 
2000 22.34 14.24 15.33 
2001 19.67 13.03 17.81 
2002 18.45 12.97 17.36 
2003 16.57 12.44 9.77 
2004 12.53 10.1 5.05 
2005 12.88 7.8 7.61 
2006 13.64 8.5 5.43 
2007 13.34 8.18 7.31 
2008 14.02 8.71 0.71 
2009 14.8 8.84 4.62 
2010 14.37 9.81 11.86 
2011 15.05 9.42 1.33 
2012 19.72 8.15 12.08 
2013 17.31 UA 10.06 
Table 5: Selected Indicative Interest Rates in Kenya (Datastream Service) 
Interest rates remained high into the 1990s (peaking in 1996) and were noted as posing a problem to 
the long term sustainability of the Kenyan banking sector given the likelihood of loan defaults and 
restriction on credit supply (Central Bank of Kenya 1995, p. 3). One measure taken by the Central 
Bank was to launch an educational program focusing on the appropriate management of loans and 
encouraged commercial banks to assist in the campaign. However, non-performing loans increased 
from the early 1990s until 2001. Research among bank managers of key institutions concluded that 
these stakeholders attributed the rise to three factors: the national economic downturn (external 
factor), customer failure to disclose vital information during the loan application process (customer 
factor) and lack of more aggressive debt collection (bank factor) (Waweru and Kalani 2009). 
In terms of physical coverage of Kenya by the banking system, despite slow growth in the number of 
branches, the commercial orientation of banks has restricted development. For example, in 1999, 
rationalisation measures by banks led to a decrease in the number of branches of banking 
institutions with four big banks accounting for majority of the branch closures (Central Bank of 
Kenya 1999, p. 5). In 2003 it was noted that rural customers were particularly hard hit by these 
measures.  
The lack of competition and appropriate regulation has also reduced  the quality of credit provision 
in Kenya. For example, it is noted by the Central Bank that many institutions have used loan interest 
calculations other than the reducing balance method and have failed to ensure customers 
understand rates of interest prior to taking out loans (Central Bank of Kenya 1998, p. 15). In terms of 
savings, banks applied high minimum balance requirements in the early 1990s, reportedly applied to 
“rid themselves of small depositors” not considered to be sufficiently profitable (Central Bank of 
Kenya 1998, p. 15). This saw many middle and low income persons unable to operate bank accounts 
(SASRA 2010, p. 9). While the consumer experience did improve, complaints returned in 1999 as 
banks sought to maintain profits, which eroded 1994-1998, by reducing operating costs and again 
increased minimum balance requirements (Central Bank of Kenya 1999). 
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Historical Development of Microcredit in Kenya 
 
This section discusses the historical growth of microcredit availability by developing the tripartite 
categorisation suggested by Dondo (No Date): which breaks the sector into Informal/Quasi-formal 
initiatives, Formal subsidised initiatives and Formal non-subsidised initiatives. Despite the usefulness 
of this categorisation for understanding the credit availability in Kenya however, it is important to 
bear in mind that informal and formal credit networks often interact (Alila 1992). 
 
1. The Informal Financial Sub-system 
 
This sector is further categorised as coming in three forms: 
a. Financial arrangement among relatives and friends. The exact magnitude of these 
transactions is impossible to estimate. Although research, by Financial Sector Deepening 
(FSD) Kenya (2014b), indicates that this is general practice and a wide-spread 
phenomenon among friends and relatives in Kamba Mathira, Kitui and Nyamira. This 
form of lending in highly embedded in culture. Credit terms are popular as many of 
these loans are interest free or charge very low interest and do not require collateral; 
this is especially when they are for education, health, or to manage other shocks. 
Repayment arrangements tend to be open-ended, and are based on reciprocity. If a 
borrower fears they will not be able to repay on the agreed date, “the best way to avoid 
the lender’s disappointment and a negative spin-off on the relationship is by explaining 
the cause of non-payment before the agreed date. This enables the borrower and the 
lender to agree on an extension or a different arrangement. Adverse personal 
circumstances of the borrower may lead to leniency on the part of the lender” (FSD 
Kenya 2014b, p. 3). Other studies show that credit from friends and relatives constitutes 
an important source of start-up capital for many micro enterprises in urban areas and 
for smallholder farmers in rural areas. However, where fund are lent for business or a 
productive purpose “the borrower may return them with ‘something on top’, which 
is literally explained as an appreciation or ‘giving back thanks’, however, this is not 
necessarily small in relation to the amount lent and can depend on the scale of the 
gain and the gratitude of the borrower” (FSD Kenya 2014c, p. iv). The introduction of 
mobile money has allowed the expansion of inter-personal lending, in addition to uni-
directional remittance payments (FSD Kenya 2014c). 
b. Traditional moneylenders / “shylocks”. Money lenders are used by individuals and 
groups to obtain credit, usually at high rates of interest. There is some evidence of 
formally registered small and medium enterprises using these as a source of working 
credit (Kariuki 1995). 
c. Shopkeepers. Many small scale shopkeeper or street sellers provide informal credit to 
clients allowing good to be taken in exchange for payment at a later date. 
 
2. The Quasi-Formal Financial Subsystem 
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Community Savings and Loans Groups. Kenya has thousands of Community Savings and Loans 
Groups which are a source of credit to millions of low-income people: and this form of financial 
services is growing strongly across the continent. These are found in both rural and urban areas, 
either as registered social welfare groups or as unregistered groups of friends and family members. 
It is for this reason they have been classified as quasi-formal organisations, as they might or might 
not be legally registered groups, although as will be discussed later, neither category are subject to 
financial regulation. NGOs have been instrumental in encouraging and supporting the development 
of such groups. For example in Marsabit, Financial Sector Deepening Kenya has funded CARE’s 
establishment and expansion of 665 Community Savings And Loans (COSALO) groups, and local NGO 
BOMA fund has established a further 350 groups (FSD Kenya 2014a, p. 10). Other groups are set up 
autonomously or are now independent following initial NGO support. Although all savings groups 
follow similar modalities of operation, there are many specific individual methodologies, in many 
cases derived from the groups selection of options depending on their own needs (FSD Kenya 2014a, 
p. 10). A good summary is offered by FSD Kenya (2014a, p. 10): 
“Groups usually comprise 15–30 members who are most often, but not exclusively, women. Group 
members are trained or facilitated to establish group by-laws which include agreeing the amount to 
be saved each month (or other period). They also set the procedures for and terms of any loans to 
be made, including repayment timeframes and interest rates. Most approaches encourage formal, 
written record keeping, however, given the high levels of illiteracy…, some groups keep verbal 
records. Some groups, most notably CARE’s COSALOs, pay out all savings and interest earnings to 
members as a lump sum at the end of each financial year. This means the capital available for 
lending must be re-established at the beginning of each subsequent year”.  
Two general types of group can be distinguished (Aghion and Morduch 2005, p. 68): 
A) Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) / Merry-go-Rounds – where weekly savings 
are made available on a rotating basis as short term credit for one member at a time. 
B) Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCAs) / Village Savings and Loans Associations 
(VSLA). Where weekly savings are made available as credit for the members on the basis of a needs 
assessment basis and allow more than one person to borrow at one time. In their most formalised 
form these organisations essentially operate as a credit cooperative or credit union). 
Borrowing from Community Savings and Loans Groups tends to carry a high rate of interest. 
However, the interest stays within the community and boosts the loan capital. Traditionally, links 
between Community Savings and Loans Groups have been limited, although some microfinance 
institutions provide them with lending funds, usually as a group loan.  
As might be expected, there is no accurate date for either informal or quasi-formal credit providing 
services, although Dondo (No Date, p. 6) offered the following estimates for the year 2000: 
Informal Microfinance Organizations Estimated Numbers 
ROSCAs and ASCAs More than 30,000 
Moneylenders More than 1000 
Unregistered Family/Neighbour/Friends Groups Various 
Table 6: Estimated Number of Community Savings and Loans Groups 
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More contemporary evidence suggests that use of quasi formal credit-giving institutions is 
geographically and culturally varied. In survey locations in Turkana (where the population is largely 
semi-nomadic pastoralists), membership of savings groups was found to be negligible, whereas in 
Marsabit (settled town) approximately 25 per cent of women surveyed were in such groups (FSD 
Kenya 2014a, p. 10).  
 
3. The Formal, Subsidised Credit System 
Arguably, the first formal microcredit initiative in Kenya was the Joint Loan Board scheme introduced 
by the colonial government in the 1950s (Dondo, pp. 2-3), designed to support farmers undertake 
agricultural modernisation (Alila 1992, pp. 1-2), as well as Kenyan industrialists, artisans, and other 
businesses. Since then the Kenyan Government has established many targeted and subsidized credit 
programs to help the development process. The principal institutions that have provided microcredit 
are (Bwonya-Wakuloba 2008; Dondo No Date): 
 Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC); 
 Kenya Industrial Estates (KIE), who provide start up, expansion and working capital (Kariuki 
1995); 
 District Joint Loan Boards (started 1951, updated 1963), Rural Enterprise Fund (1991) District 
Poverty Eradication Program (2002), and; 
 Kenya Tourist Development Corporation (KTDC). 
Overall, it has been noted that government credit schemes have performed poorly in terms of 
repayment speed and default rates (Bwonya-Wakuloba 2008).  However, in 2004 it was estimated 
that there were still more than 20 Joint Loan Board Schemes and two government owned 
organisations that provide publically subsidised credit under various conditions (Dondo No Date, p. 
6).  
Alongside these programs NGOs began to offer administered credit programs for Micro and Small 
Enterprises (MSEs) using capital provided by foreign aid agencies (Dondo, p. 3; Wanyama 2009). 
These range from small charitable units operating in a limited geographical area to large institutions, 
covering vast areas and carrying out a variety of development and welfare activities.  Increasingly, 
organizations have emerged with the primary objective to provide financial services to micro and 
small enterprises. For example CARE acquired Wedco Enterprise Development Limited to create 
WEDCO (2000), the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) established Small and Micro 
Enterprise Program (SMEP) (1999), Plan International created Business Initiatives and Management 
Assistance Services (BIMAS) (1997) and World Vision the Kenya Agency for the Development of 
Enterprise and Technology (KADET) (2000). Starting roughly in the 1980s innovations appeared as a 
number of NGOs have developed microfinance assistance models that do not require tangible 
collateral and are more cost-effective to in supporting clients with limited financial capacity. 
However, a significant limitation to subsidised credit initiatives is that they are limited by the extent 
of donor capital. Although such organisations have been formally registered under a variety of 
frameworks, their financial operations have until recently remained largely unregulated (Dondo No 
Date). In contemporary regulatory discourse these organisations are referred to as Non-Deposit 
Taking Microfinance Institutions (NDT-MFIs) or Credit Only Microfinance Institutions. It is however, 
also important to note that microcredit is also widely provided for purposes other than for business 
development, and some evidence suggests that where data is kept, misreporting might be an issue: 
as loans officially for investment are directed in part of in whole to consumption (Karlan and Zinman 
2012).  
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Obtaining an historical or contemporary understanding of the size and characters of the formal 
microfinance sector in Kenya is problematic. Data is limited and fragmented; there is no institution 
which has committed to capture information from all formal institutions which might legitimately be 
considered to belong to the sector. For example, the Central Bank has only been able to report on 
those institutions which have registered under the newly developed Microfinance Act (2008). The 
Association of Microfinance Intuitions (AMFI) only produced reports from 2012 and was only been 
able to reply on a sample of their members, which themselves only represent a small number of 
microfinance providers in the country. For this reason “the exact number of practitioners 
undertaking credit-only microﬁnance business in Kenya is largely unknown” (Central Bank of Kenya 
2009, p. 11). 
   
4. The Formal, Non-Subsidised Credit System 
  
In addition to formal banks, non-subsidised credit institutions also existed in the form of the Thrifts 
that emerged in the 1940s and 1950s (Alila 1990, p. 6). However, these organisations were very 
different from more recent organisations for the private administration of savings and credit. At the 
current time, non-public credit providers can be subdivided into two sub-categories of initiative:  1) 
Savings and Credit Co-operative Societies (SACCOs), 2) Formal Banks. 
 
4.1. Savings and Credit Co-operative Societies (SACCOs)  
Despite the existence of co-operatives in Kenya since the turn of the 20th century, it was following 
independence that cooperatives began to administer the provision of financial services to their 
members (Alila 1990, p. 8). One part of this initiative was the creation of Savings and Credit Co-
operative Societies (SACCOs). It is reported that the first such financial service focused cooperatives 
was register in 1964 (Alila 1990, p. 12); in 1969 it was required that new registrations were formed 
of members with a common bond (Alila 1990, p. 13); and in 1986 were formally named as SACOS 
(Alila 1990, p. 12). Today these are registered under the Co-operative Societies Act and formed by 
members with common employment, geographical location or economic activity. See Table 7 for the 
details of SACCO expansion in Kenya, however, it should be noted that these figures are for legally 
registered SACCOs. While evidence suggests that as many as 30% of registered SACOs might not be 
active it is also the case that organisations operate without being registered (Wanyama 2009, p. 19). 
Therefore, statistics should be taken as indicative as opposed to truly representative. 
SACCOs can further be divided into: 1) Non-Deposit Taking SACCOS (NDT-S), which provide a limited 
range of savings and credit products, are registered and supervised under the Cooperative Services 
Act, CAP 490; and 2) Deposit Taking SACCOS (DTS), are licensed and supervised under the SACCO 
Societies Act of, 2008, and in addition to basic savings and credit products, also provide basic 
‘banking’ services including Front Office Savings Activities (FOSA) or demand deposits, payments 
services and ATMs (SASRA 2013, p. 13). As a general trend, SACCOS have started as NDT-S and then 
in many cases developed to take deposits in order to expand the range of financial services to 
members (SASRA 2013, p. 13). 
 
Most SACCOs however, accept monthly payment, either from income from the sale of produce or 
monthly salaries, for shares (taken as savings), and from which members may then borrow up to two 
or three times the value, if they can get other members to guarantee them. Such loan are offered 
either for 1) investments, such as buying land, building houses, running business and farming 
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activities; and 2) consumption, such as buying household furniture and meeting other family 
obligations (Wanyama 2009, p. 26). Although the number of rural SACCOs has for much of their 
history been outweighed by urban SACCOS, it is argued that these have played an important role in 
providing financial services to their members. This was particularly true from around 1997, when 
rural SACCOS were able to substitute for the formal banking sector, which was at that time closing 
many of its rural bank branches as a result of financial problems (Ministry of Finance, p. 7). Usually 
urban based SACCOs also offer loans in the form of cash salary advances that are popularly referred 
to as “instant loans” (Wanyama 2009). Under varying conditions, SACCOs approve and pay these 
advances within one day and often five minutes, in order to enable members respond to unexpected 
social costs. SACCOs do not clearly categorize loans, however, most are officially registered in the 
category of personal/household sector with large amounts utilized for school/college fees, general 
development and for emergency purposes (SASRA 2011, p. 28).   
 
Year 
Number of all 
Registered 
SACCOS 
Members in 
Registered 
SACCOs 
Savings and 
Share Capital of 
Registered 
SACCOs in 
Kenyan Shillings 
(KSh) (loans) 
Number of 
Active SACCOs 
1964 7 UA UA UA 
1971 129 UA 8 million UA 
1972 101 36,000 16.2 million UA 
1975 230 101,000 118 million UA 
1978 520/630 387,500 375 million UA 
1980 731 UA 898 million UA 
1981 716 403,000 1.5 billion UA 
1982 900 500,000 1.6 billion UA 
1984 1022 600,000 2.7 billion UA 
1985 1350 694,000 3.3 billion UA 
1986 1462 930,000 3.5 billion UA 
1988 UA 982,287 7.9 billion UA 
1989 UA UA 9 billion UA 
1990 2,144 UA UA UA 
2003 4,200 3,500,000 UA UA 
2004 4,474 3,642,000 150 billion UA 
2005 4,678 4,602,000 UA UA 
2006 4,876 5,420,000 110 billion 3,300 
2007 5,122 6,286,000 160 billion 3,500 
2008 5,350 UA UA UA 
2010 6,737 UA UA 3,280 
2011 UA UA UA UA 
2012 UA UA UA 1,989 
2013 UA UA UA 1,995 
2014 UA UA UA UA 
Table 7: The Expansion of SACCOs in Kenya (Compiled by the author from various sources: Alila 1990, 
p. 12; Central Bank of Kenya 2007, p. 18; 2008, p. 17; Dondo No Date, p. 4; Wanyama 2009, pp. 18-
20) 
A breakdown of the two categories of SACCOS can be seen in Table 8, while Table 9 shows the 
classification of Deposit Taking SACCOs by sector. The financial performance of all licenced and 
compliant SACCOS can be seen in Table 10, and the performance of DTS in Kenya can be seen in 
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Table 10 respectively. It is worth noting that in terms of their assets, some individual SACCOS (for 
example the Harambee, Posta and Mwalimu SACCOs) are larger than some of the small commercial 
banks. Their rapid growth backs claims that SACCOs are filling a need, which has not been met by 
other financial institutions. However, if and how SACCOs can remain competitive with the entry of 
new organisations into more accessible financial services, remains to be seen. 
 
Year 
Number of DTS 
(licenced)* 
Total Assets of 
licenced DTS 
Number of Non-
DTS (compliant)** 
Total Active 
SACCOs 
(compliant) 
2006 214 (NA) NA UA UA 
2007 214 (NA) NA UA UA 
2008 214 (NA) NA UA UA 
2009 218 (Unknown) UA UA UA 
2010 215 (Unknown) UA 3,065 3,280 
2011 215 (110)* UA UA UA 
2012 215 (124)* UA UA (1,989) 
2013 215 (135)* 242 billion Over 6000  (1,780) (1,995) 
Table 8: Numbers of DT & NDT SACCOs in Kenya (Compiled by author from a variety of sources: 
SASRA 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) 
* Licencing for DTS was introduced in 2008 under the SACCO Societies Act, 2008 (Act No.14) (Central 
Bank of Kenya 2008, p. 17). DTS have until June 17th 2014 to comply with licencing requirements or 
cease deposit taking SACCO business (SASRA 2013, p. 13). 
** Compliant having submitted audited financial statement with the Commissioner for Cooperative 
Development as required by law. 
 
Year* 
 
Number of Deposit Taking SACCOs 
Government 
(licenced) 
Farmers 
(licenced) 
Private 
institutions 
(licenced) 
Community 
based** 
(licenced) 
Teachers 
 
Others*** 
TOTAL 
(licenced) 
2010 44 74 26 NA 46 25 215 
2011 87 (42) 74 (40) 24 (14) 30 (14) NA NA 215 (110) 
2012 41 (22) 73 (42) 24( 14) 32 (17) 45 (29) NA 215 (124) 
2013 (27) (44) (18) (14) (32) NA (135) 
Table 9: DTS by Sector (Compiled by author from a variety of sources: SASRA 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) 
* As of end of December **. Traders, Transport and Housing ***. These include Traders based 
SACCOs, Transport based SACCOs and church based SACCOs. 
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Performance 
item 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
2011 2012 2013 
To
tal 
Li
ce
n
ce
d
 
To
ta
l 
Li
ce
n
ce
d
 
To
ta
l 
Li
ce
n
ce
d
 
Total Assets 
(Billion KSh) 
105 115 134 146 171 196 166 
223 
 
201 
 
503 
 
241 
 
Loans 
/Advances 
(Billion KSh) 
68 77 90 102 123 147 126 167 154 381 
184 
 
Deposits 
/savings 
(Billion KSh) 
51 61 71 105 123 140 119 160 146 358 172 
Share Capital 
(Billion KSh) 
2 2.4 2.7 4.2 5.4 UA UA UA 7.6 UA 10.6 
Turnover 
(Billion 
KSh) 
12 13 15 17 22 24 20 30 28 UA 33 
Members 0.98 0.95 1 1.5 1.5 2 1.4 2.5 2.3 5.4 2.6 
Table 10: Performance of DTS in Kenya (Compiled by author from a variety of sources: SASRA 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013)3
                                                          
3
 Please note, as stated at the beginning of this report, all financial values are nominal figures. 
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Although SACCOs are largely self-sufficient, a number of international development agencies have 
supported through various means. In addition to general capacity building, the European Investment 
Bank of the European Union has provided ongoing lines of credit to the Cooperative Bank of Kenya 
for on-lending to rural SACCOs (Wanyama 2009, p. 24). Domestically, the interests of SACCOs are 
collectively represented in the policy-making and legislative processes by The Kenya Union of 
Savings and Credit Cooperatives (KUSCCO); although this organisation also provides credit for 
SACCOs through the Central Finance Programme and a mortgage facility for through the KUSCCO 
Housing Fund (Wanyama 2009, p. 13). The Kenya Rural Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies 
Union (KERUSSU) is the umbrella national cooperative organization for rural SACCOs and other forms 
of savings and credit associations in Kenya (Wanyama 2009, p. 14). The organisation provides 
cooperative microfinance workshops to sensitize members on access to finance in rural areas 
(Wanyama 2009, p. 14). 
 
4.2. Deposit Mobilizing Microfinance Providers 
Deposit Mobilizing Microfinance Providers (DMMP) can be further subdivided into two categories: 1) 
Banks offering microfinance services; 2) Deposit Taking Microfinance Institutions (DT-MFIs). 
4.2.1. Formal banks, registered and regulated under the Banking Act (see below), have also begun to 
provide microcredit. In some cases, this has occurred where longstanding commercial banks 
have down-scaled their products or set up subsidiary companies to specifically engage in 
microfinance business (Central Bank of Kenya 2010). Notable examples include, Kenya Post 
Office Savings Bank, the Co-operative Bank of Kenya4, Equity Bank and Family Finance Building 
Society. In the case of the cooperative Bank it was decided in 1998 that its existing Small and 
Micro Credit Unit would continuing to wholesale funds to financial intermediaries such as 
cooperatives but also start its own direct lending on a pilot basis (Bell et al. 2002). DfID 
supported this by providing funding for technical assistance that it needed to develop new 
products and methodologies, and to make the necessary institutional changes (Bell et al. 
2002). The microfinance programme was launched on a pilot basis in two branches during the 
first quarter of 1999 (Bell et al. 2002). In other cases, NGO initiatives have registered under 
the Banking Act following compliance with all stipulations including the minimum paid up 
capital of KShs: 0.5 billion (Dondo No Date, p. 7). The first to do this was K-Rep in In March, 
1999 (Dondo No Date, p. 7). 
 
4.2.2. Deposit Taking Microfinance Institutions (DT-MFIs) also accept demand deposits are use 
these as a means to generate capital for the extension of credit to customers.  These 
organisations are registered under the Microfinance Act (2008). These are not fully registered 
banks but are subject to many of the same conditions under the prudential control of the 
Central Bank, given that they use customer deposits to raise capital for independent loans. 
Based on what information is available, a survey reported by the Central Bank in the year 
(2000, p. 42) identified that an undisclosed number of major micro-finance institutions 
provided credit to 102,304 active clients with a loan portfolio of KShs 1.6 billion. Furthermore, 
there were 103,856 active savers (voluntary and forced) with the total value of KShs 812 
                                                          
4
 The Bank was registered as a cooperative in 1965. For a long time, the bank maintained cooperative  
ownership as 70 per cent of the bank’s shares were held by cooperatives and individual coperators held 30 per 
cent (Wanyama 2009, p. 12). This might have changed with the 2008 share offer.  
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million. Dondo offers the following “estimates of the various types of microfinance institutions 
operating in Kenya” as of December 2004 (Dondo No Date, p. 6). 
Type of Microfinance Organization Number 
Commercial Banks * 3 
Microfinance NGOs 56 
Societies 1 
Companies Limited by Shares 12 
Companies Limited by Guarantee 7 
Post Office Savings Bank 1 
Table 11: Estimates of Institutions offering Formal MF in 2004 
In 2004, it was also estimated that the reach of microfinance in Kenya was around 1 million 
if SACCOs were excluded, and around 4 million (12% of the population) where SACCO credit, 
mainly as consumer loans, were included (Dondo No Date, p. 7). The outreach of commercial 
banks to the poor and rural communities is noted to be limited and has even been in decline 
between 1994 and 2004 (Dondo No Date, p. 8).  However, these statistics did not 
differentiate between DT-MFIs and NDT-MFIs. 
As discussed later in the report, 1999 saw the emergence of the Association of Microfinance 
Institutions in Kenya (AMFI-K). While the details of membership offer some idea of the 
growth of the sector, with a summary provided in Table 12, this information falls well short 
of a full account of the microfinance institutions in the country. 
Year 
Total 
AMFI 
Members 
Banks 
DT-
MFIs 
Retail 
MFIs 
Outlets 
Loan 
Portfolio 
(billion) 
Borrowers 
(millions) 
Deposits 
(billion) 
Savers 
(millions)5 
1999 5 UA UA UA UA UA UA UA UA 
2006 UA UA UA UA 531 22.84 0.66 8.1 0.72 
2007 34 UA UA 21 648 33.56 
0.95 
 
11.8 1.1 
2008 34 UA UA 30 825 46.52 1.26 15.8 1.44 
2009 41 UA UA UA UA UA UA UA UA 
2010 51 UA UA UA UA UA UA UA UA 
2011 UA UA UA UA UA UA UA UA UA 
2012 59 UA UA UA UA UA UA UA UA 
2013 62 5 9 38 UA UA UA UA UA 
2014 62 UA UA UA UA UA UA UA UA 
Table 12: AMFI (AMFI 2012, 2013a) 
4.3. Consumer Credit Providers. Many formal retailers offer credit services provided by third 
parties other than Formal Banks of Microfinance Institutions. For example, Airtel offers credit for 
airtime through a partnership with a Consumer Credit provider. 
 
                                                          
5
 Excluding commercial banks. 
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4.4. Wholesale Microcredit Organisations. In order to address the reliance of many microfinance 
institutions on donor support, wholesale lending institutions emerged in Kenya: and by 2004 there 
were four such organisations, Jitegemee Trust Ltd, Micro Enterprise Support Project Trust (MESPT), 
Oiko Credit and Stromme Foundation (Dondo No Date, p. 11). In addition K-Rep Bank and Co-
operative Bank had developed products for lending to SACCOs.  AFD funding to Co-operative Bank, 
K-Rep Bank and Equity Bank for wholesaling to MFIs was also expected to increase lending to MFIs 
(Dondo No Date, p. 11). 
 
4.5. Other Stakeholders in the Kenyan Microfinance Sector. Over the years a number of 
international private investors have provided equity to MFIs. IFC, AfDB, ShoreCap, Triodoes Doen, 
FMO have invested in K-Rep Bank while Africap have a 16% stake in Equity Bank (Dondo No Date, p. 
11).  Other international investors in the MFI sector have been Accion, Microvest, Unitas and catalyst 
Fund. In 2005, Faulu Kenya raised KShs. 500 million in Kenya by issuing a bond on the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange.  The bond was fully subscribed by institutional investors – pension funds and commercial 
banks. The bond was made attractive by a 75% underwrite and an offer of a 0.5% above the Treasury 
Bill rate (Dondo No Date, p. 11). 
 
Overall Structure of the Microfinance in Kenya (excluding SACCOS) 
 
Although AMFI-K have published two annual reports in 2012 and 2013, their membership does not 
cover all the microfinance institutions in the country, and of the total membership of 32, only 29 
institutions contributed to the survey (AMFI 2012, 2013a). For this reason, the reports are of limited 
use in understanding the coverage of the microfinance sector in Kenya, although they are 
considered by AMFI to be a representative sample of the characteristics within the sector. Another 
issue in the reporting of microfinance is that banks would need to separate statistics for 
microfinance from wider banking operations (AMFI 2013a). While some of those contributing to the 
report have already done so, this is according to their own definitions, and it is noted that a lack of 
common definition of microfinance hampers coherent reporting (AMFI 2013a). The following 
summary should therefore be read with these constrains in mind.  
The total assets of the formal microfinance sector have expanded 2010-2012. Although DT-MFI grew 
the most in 2012 (32%), followed by Credit-only MFIs (26%) and Banks (20%), the overall makeup of 
the microfinance sector remained stable, with large domination by the banks, with Equity Bank 
alone comprising 72% of the sector’s overall total assets (AMFI 2013b, p. 7). The growth of banks is 
however declining (36% growth 2010 viz 21% 2012) while the other institutions have increased the 
rate of expansion over the last three years (AMFI 2013b, p. 7).  The largest DTM in Kenya has been 
Kenya Women’s Finance Trust (KWFT). However, net assets shrunk for the first time in 2013, 
contracting from 61.5 per cent in 2012 to 53.19 per cent (Sh21.75 billion) (Central Bank of Kenya 
2013). 
Size of loans by Type of Lender  
Between 2010 and 2012, the growth in number of microfinance active borrowers was much higher 
for Credit only MFIs (+21%) than for Banks (-3.4%) and DT-MFI (+0.5%). The average outstanding 
loan balance was the lowest for Credit only MFIs, followed by DT-MFI then Banks (AMFI 2013b, p. 8). 
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Gender Balance of Loan Access  
Women represent a large majority of borrowers (65.6% of the entire sector and 70.9% of the sector 
without bank’s active borrowers in 2012) but their share has been decreasing over the period of 
analysis: a pattern that might related to more individual borrowing by males over time. DT-MFI are 
the segment having the highest share of women borrowers, as KWFT (64% of total DT-MFI active 
borrowers) lends almost exclusively to women. This trend suggests that on average women tend to 
take out midsized loans, with more men accessing larger sums of credit.  
Branches and Geographical Distribution 
As of December 2012, microfinance services were provided by 292 Banks branches, 105 DT-MFI 
offices and 164 Credit-only MFI outlets (AMFI 2012, p. 9).  The sample taken by AMFI suggests that 
there is a higher concentration of institutions in the southern parts of the country and a higher 
density in the main towns and cities, particularly Nairobi. 
 
Regressing the number of branches and active borrowers in each province (done by author), 
suggests that 78% of variation in the number of active borrowers can be explained by the number of 
branches available – with a significance F/P-value of 0.0035 and a predictor that for every additional 
branch opened, active borrowers will increase by over 1,000 individuals. 
Financial Structure 
The balance sheets for the sector as a whole, and the sector without banks, are very different: the 
whole sector mostly funds itself with clients deposits (62% of total assets in 2012) while the sector 
without banks mostly funds itself with borrowings (38% of total assets), followed by clients deposits 
(32%) (AMFI 2013b, p. 10). This has reportedly changed little over the last three years, although the 
sectors without banks experienced a reduction of the share of the debt funding and an increase of 
the share of clients’ deposits.  As would be expected credit-only MFIs borrow the largest percentage 
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of their assets, 49% (AMFI 2013b, p. 10). This source of funding also grew by 44%, although banks 
increased borrowing by 78%, DT-MFI only by 5%. In 2012, DT-MFI experienced a stronger growth of 
the clients’ deposits than banks (+54.3% against +13.4%). In response to the context of high inflation 
in Kenya in 2011, the cost of funding increased with most financial institutions adjusting their 
interest rates upwards.  
Loan Use 
A wide range of credit products is offered in the market financing specific sectors such as business, 
agriculture, the consumer segment including health and education etc.; asset finance, housing and 
green products. In 2010-2012, business loans represent the great majority of the portfolio, followed 
by consumption loans, Emergency loans and agriculture loans (AMFI 2013b, p. 15).  
Lending Methodologies 
DT-MFI and Credit-only MFIs concentrate in the core microcredit methodology involving a higher 
ration of operational costs to income than banks, which in turn results in a  higher interest for clients 
(AMFI 2013b, p. 11). The DT-MFI’ loan book is mostly concentrated in the group lending 
methodology (55% - with 44% individual lending) while the largest share of the Credit-Only MFIs’ 
and Banks’ portfolios consists mostly of individual lending: 57% and 62% respectively (AMFI 2013b, 
p. 15). The “vast majority of Credit Only MFIs charge flat interest rates” (AMFI 2013b, p. 11).  
Loan Costs to Consumers 
The main fees include the loan application fees and the loan insurance fees. There is a wide disparity 
in the interest rates as revealed by the gap between the minimum and maximum rates especially in 
the sector excluding banks. Here the majority of organisations apply flat interest rates as opposed to 
the declining balance method. 
Training 
Group trainings are the most widely offered non-financial services covering some basic aspects of 
group, loan and business management (9 Credit Only MFIs, 2 DT-MFI and 2 Banks). 4 Credit Only 
MFIs and 1 DTM report to offer business trainings. 
 
Policy and Regulation for Microfinance in Kenya 
 
Under Vision 2030 – the Kenyan Government’s current long term planning strategy (Government of 
the Republic of Kenya 2007) – it is expected that a significant share of population currently using 
informal to quasi-formal finance (about 35% of the overall population) will migrate to formal 
services. It is anticipated that this will be achieved by increasing  the percentage of the population 
served by MFIs and SACCOs. The reform of regulation has been expected to play a significant role in 
this process. 
Overall, the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), which falls under the Minister of Finance, formulates and 
implements monetary policy and banking regulation, in order to foster liquidity, solvency, and 
proper functioning of the financial system. However, the prudential banking sector is also regulated 
by the Capital Markets Authority (CMA), Insurance Regulatory Authority (IRA), Retirement Benefit 
Authority (RBA) and SACCO Societies Regulatory Authority (SASRA) (Central Bank of Kenya 2013, p. 
14). Non-prudential institutions are subject to non-prudential oversight by regulatory agencies or 
government departments/ministries with focused legislations.  
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The significance of the microfinance sector was first recognised by the CBK as early as 1994, when it 
was observed that:  
“Though the formal sector is relatively developed, it is apparent that the financial needs of the 
informal sector have not been well addressed. In view of the importance of this sector, it is 
important that strategies of ensuring its orderly development be devised. Therefore, the Central 
Bank will liaise with the various stakeholders associated with microfinance to evaluate how the 
sector can be assisted in terms of registration, regulation and integration into the formal banking 
sector” (Central Bank of Kenya 1997, p. 3). 
 
Regulation of Microfinance Institutions 
Despite the identified importance of regulation for microfinance in Kenya, little can be found in 
official bank publications until 1998 when it was identified that regulation would be necessary. It 
was only in 1999 that the Central Bank established a division to handle microfinance and in the same 
year the Association of Micro Finance Institutions of Kenya (AMFI) was formed under the societies 
Act by the leading Microfinance Institutions in Kenya. A history of some of the key financial 
regulation can be found in Table 13. The objective of the membership organisation is to build the 
capacity of the microfinance sector through the functions of: lobbying government for favourable 
policies; sharing information and experiences and linking up and network with both local and 
international actors. AMFI and the CBK began to work together in 1999 to create a strategy for 
regulation of the microfinance sector (Central Bank of Kenya 1998, p. 4). The Central Bank set up a 
Microfinance Division within the Bank Supervision Department (now Financial Institutions 
Department) in 2000 (Wanyama 2009, p. 7). In 2004, the Central Bank established a Rural Finance 
Department to address various policy issues concerning rural finance, including microfinance 
(Wanyama 2009, p. 7). 
Year Legislation Overview 
1966 Central Bank of Kenya Act of 1966  
1968 Banking Act (1968)  
1994 Amendments to the Banking Act (1994)  
1996 Central Bank (Amendment) Act of 1996  
1997 
Amendments to the Central Bank of 
Kenya Act 
Greater monetary autonomy for CBK; 
technically independent of the government 
2006 Microfinance Act 2006  
2008 
Microfinance Act (2008) 
The Microfinance (DT-MFI) Regulations 
2008 
Regulate the establishment, business and 
operations of Deposit Taking Microfinance 
Institutions under CBK to mobilise savings from 
the general public to provide credit for clients. 
SACCO Societies Act of 2008 
Licensing, regulation, supervision and 
promotion of savings and credit cooperatives 
by the SACCO Societies Regulatory 
Authority. Establishes relevance of Deposit 
Guarantee Fund 
The Banking (Credit Reference Bureau) 
Regulations (2008) 
Allowed CBK to license and supervise Credit 
Reference Bureaus (CRBs) 
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The Finance Act (2008) 
Raised the minimum core capital for banks 
(KShs 250m to KShs 1 billion by end of 2012) 
Islamic banking practices required to pay 
return 
2010 
Constitution of Kenya 2010 
Finance Act (2010) inc amendments to 
Banking Act, Central Bank of Kenya Act 
Deposit Taking Microﬁnance Institutions (DT-
MFI) were allowed to contract 
third parties to carry out business on their 
behalf 
2011 
The National Payment System Act 
(2011) 
 
2012 
Kenya Deposit Insurance Act 2012 
Consumer Protection Act (2012) 
Contains some specific requirements and 
limitations of lenders: Disclosure statements, 
restricts on recovery costs etc 
2014 
Banking Act (2014) 
Central Bank of Kenya Act (2014) 
 
Table 13: Development of Banking and Financial Regulation 
 
Regulatory reform has advanced under the premise that previous governance has restricted the 
development of micro finance initiatives. Specifically, and despite shrinking donor support, such 
institutions have been unable to mobilise deposits, unless licensed under the Banking Act and 
therefore subject to the myriad of requirements (Central Bank of Kenya 2000, p. 42). Other 
regulatory problems were that institutions involved in providing microcredit were registered under 
as many as eight different Acts of Parliament (outlined in Table 14) and therefore different legal 
structures. Some of these Acts did not address the issues of ownership structure, governance, and 
accountability. This organic regulation was therefore understood to have “contributed to a large 
extent to the poor performance and eventual demise of many MFIs because of a lack of appropriate 
regulatory oversight” (Wanyama 2009, p. 5). 
The Non-governmental Organizations Co-
ordination Act 
The Kenya Post Office Savings Bank (KPOSB) Act 
The Building Societies Act The Companies Act 
The Trustee Act The Banking Act 
The Societies Act The Co-operative Societies Act 
Table 14: Acts Regulating Microfinance Institutions prior to reform 
Finally, regulations have been motivated by a need to safeguard the interests of various 
stakeholders’ savers/depositors, borrowers, investors (Dondo No Date, p. 10). Indeed, Donde (No 
Date, p. 10 ) reports that “The need for regulation has been reinforced by the emergence of bogus 
microfinance institutions that have fleeced the public of money.  Since June 2005 the Central Bank 
has closed three such organizations:  Kenya Akiba Microfinance Ltd, Mayford Co-op, and Capital 
Microfinance Ltd.  All were registered as Limited Liability Companies”. It was partly this situation that 
prompted the development of a draft Micro-finance Policy. 
In 2001 it was recognised that what was needed was a “wider policy framework of dealing with 
second tier institutions including microfinance, savings and credit cooperative societies and other 
unregulated financial intermediaries” (Central Bank of Kenya 2001, p. 1). However, it was also clear 
that larger financial institutions, such as the Co-operative Bank of Kenya, Equity Building Society and 
K- REP were moving into microfinance with individual lending products. With such diversity, 
regulators began to consider a three tier system: 
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 First tier: Informally constituted MFIs like rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), 
club pools, financial services associations should not be regulated by an external agency. Donors, 
commercial banks and government agencies from which they obtain funds or that support them 
should carry out due diligence and make informed decisions about them.  
 Second tier: Formally constituted micro finance organizations that do not accept deposits from 
the general public but accept cash collateral tied to loan contracts could be regulated and 
supervised by a self-regulatory (umbrella) body like Association of Micro finance Institutions 
(AMFI). The proposed legislation could empower AMFI to enforce compliance with its laid down 
regulations. 
 Third tier: Formally Constituted Deposit-taking MFIs could be licensed, regulated and 
supervised by the Central Bank.  
 
In the words of Omino, different treatment of these institutions should be understood as justified 
and necessary as “Deposit taking involves a potential risk of loss depending on how the deposits are 
employed. As such, MFIs intending to take deposits must be regulated and supervised by an external 
authority to ensure that deposits are prudently employed and cushioned by adequate capitalization” 
(Wanyama 2009, p. 5).  
There was also discussions on effective supervision of other financial intermediaries including 
SACCOs and the Kenya Post Office Savings Bank (POSTBANK) (Central Bank of Kenya 2001, p. 51). 
Interestingly, microfinance does not make an appearance in the 2002 Central Bank Supervision 
Report. However, the focus returned in 2003 when the Minister for Finance reiterated the increasing 
role of the microfinance for micro and small enterprises and low income households (Central Bank of 
Kenya 2003, p. 35). During this year, a Task Force was formed to co-ordinate the development of an 
appropriate regulatory framework for microfinance, and following consultation with stakeholders, a 
draft Bill was forwarded to the Attorney General for publication and presentation to Parliament 
(Central Bank of Kenya 2003, p. 35). The draft Bill proposed the above tripartite categorisation and 
associated governance proposals for microfinance activities. 2004 saw refinement of the 
Microfinance Bill and also consultation that produced the draft SACCO Regulatory Bill: designed to 
establish an authority to regulate SACCO societies, and especially those with Front Office Services 
(FOSA) (Central Bank of Kenya 2004, pp. 28-29). The mention of microfinance is missing from the 
Central Banks supervision report in 2005 (Central Bank of Kenya 2005).  
The following year the Microfinance Act (2006) and the Finance Act (2006) were enacted in 
December (Central Bank of Kenya 2006) and published in the Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 103 on 
2nd January 2007 (Central Bank of Kenya 2007, p. 44). The Act envisaged two tiers of microfinance 
institution, i.e. nationwide microfinance institutions whose minimum core capital is prescribed at 
KShs 60m, and community microfinance institutions with a minimum core capital of KShs 20m 
(Central Bank of Kenya 2006, p. 33). The Microfinance Act and the associated Microfinance 
Regulations, outlined the legal, regulatory and supervisory framework for the microfinance industry 
in Kenya through licensing and supervision (Central Bank of Kenya 2014b). In 2007, it was 
anticipated that the KCB would begin licensing DT-MFIs the following year (Central Bank of Kenya 
2007, p. 26). The Microfinance (Categorization of the Deposit-Taking Microfinance Institutions) 
Regulations, 2008, the Microfinance (Deposit-Taking Microfinance Institutions) Regulations, 2008 
and the commencement date of 2nd May 2008 were gazetted through the special issue, Kenya 
Gazette Supplement No. 36 dated 16th May 2008 and published on 29th May 2008. The Central 
Bank commenced the implementation of the Microfinance Act from 2nd May 2008 (Central Bank of 
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Kenya 2008, p. 37). The Act applies to both DT-MFIs and NDT-MFIs (Central Bank of Kenya 2009, p. 
10). Here it is identified that:  
“Non-Deposit Taking Microﬁnance Institutions that accept cash collateral are expected to open 
clients’ accounts and hold such funds in trust without intermediating such funds or borrowing 
against the same at the institution’s risk. The accounts of clients of Non-Deposit Taking MFIs must at 
all times be separated from the operating account of the institution” (Central Bank of Kenya 2009, p. 
11).    
In 2008, the MOCD&M established a Task Force to work out modalities for the establishment of a 
new body, the SACCOS Societies Regulatory Authority, to license, regulate and supervise SACCOs; as 
well as develop regulations to be issued under the Act to operationalize it. This work was expected 
to be concluded in 2009 (Central Bank of Kenya 2008, p. 17).  
By the end of 2008, nine applications had been received for registration as a DT-MFI. CBK licensed 
the ﬁrst Deposit Taking Microﬁnance Institution, Faulu Kenya Deposit Taking Microﬁnance, in May 
2009 (Central Bank of Kenya 2009, p. viii & 11), and applications and licencing has continued to grow 
(as can be seen in Table 15, while Table 16 lists all DT-MFIs and there registration dates).  
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2008 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 UA 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2010 9 4 5 2 376 
6.17 
billion (1 
million) 
14.2 
billion 
(0.6 
million) 
23.4 
2011 3 1 6 6 60 10 billion 16 24.8 
2012 UA UA UA 6 UA    
2013 
Not 
available 
1 9 9 UA 
6.4 billion 
(1.9 
million) 
24 billion 
(0.4 
million) 
UA 
 Table 15: Number Applications and Licences as DT-MFIs (Central Bank of Kenya 2008, p. 37) 
 
Institution Registration Date 
Faulu Kenya DTM May 2009 
Kenya Women Finance Trust DTM April 2010 
Uwezo DTM November 2010 
SMEP DTM December 2010 
Remu DTM Limited December 2010 
Rafiki Deposit Taking Microfinance (K) Limited June 2011 
Century Deposit Taking Microfinance Limited September 2012 
SUMAC DTM Limited October 2012 
                                                          
6
 Although reported in 2011 as 34. 
7
 Although reported in 2011 as 8 billion and 6.7  
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U&I Deposit Taking Microfinance Limited April 2014 
Table 16: Registered MFI in Kenya (as of July 2014) 
An amendment to the Banking Act through the Finance Act 2009 permitted banks to use Third 
Agents to provide certain banking services on their behalf (FSD Kenya 2010a, p. 10). This included 
DT-MFIs which were then expected to increase their penetration in the rural areas and generally 
increase the number of the population using the services of banks (FSD Kenya 2010a, p. 28). The 
agent banking model was mainly designed to assist banks in providing cost effective banking and 
Agents were empowered to deal with: 
1. Cash deposits 
2. Cash withdrawals 
3. Payment of bills 
4. Account balance enquiry 
5. Collection of account opening application forms. 
In 2011, the CBK develop a ‘Guideline on the Appointment and Operations of Third Party Agents by 
Deposit Taking Microfinance Institutions’ to extend the agency model to DT-MFIs and allow them to 
engage third parties to offer specified deposit taking business on their behalf (FSD Kenya 2010b, p. 
10). The Finance Act (2011) amended the Banking Act and Microfinance Act to allow institutions 
licensed under the Banking Act to share credit information on their customers with institutions 
licensed under the Microfinance Act. Other regulations disqualified individuals who were part of a 
management team in collapsed financial institutions from being directors or senior officers in DT-
MFIs (FSD Kenya 2010b, p. 35).  
In 2012, reforms allowed microfinance banks to offer their services in marketing offices and self-
managed agencies (Central Bank of Kenya 2013, p. 15). AMFI successfully lobbied to change the 
name of Deposit Taking Microfinance Institutions to Microfinance Banks MFBs) (Central Bank of 
Kenya 2013, p. 39) – although they were to remain under the regulation of the Microfinance Act. 
Legislation also revised Prudential Guidelines under the Banking Act and the Microfinance Act 2006 
through the Microfinance (Amendment) Bill 2013 to increase the range of financial services that 
MFBs can offer (Central Bank of Kenya 2013, p. 12). This legislation also responded to the challenges 
faced by institutions licensed under the Microfinance Act in identifying, selecting and acquiring 
agents (Central Bank of Kenya 2013, p. 39).  
Reforms amended 2006 legislation to allow the sub-contracting of banking agents to provide limited 
MFB services on behalf of institutions (Central Bank of Kenya 2013, p. 39). Changes also allow for the 
use of Agent Network Managers (ANM) or Agent Network Management Companies (ANMC), also 
known as aggregators, in overseeing the day-to-day operations of agents, in addition to providing 
strategic information to the respective financial institutions (Central Bank of Kenya 2013, p. 15). 
Banks and microfinance banks are also now empowered to enter into single contracts with ANM 
rather than multiple contracts with individual agents. This new intermediate tier of service provision 
was intended to ensure compliance, managing liquidity and training of agents (Central Bank of Kenya 
2013, p. 15). This legislation had immediate impact. By December 2013, 6 out of the 9 licensed 
microfinance banks had established deposit-taking marketing offices: 5 of these came in 2012 and 
another 42 in 2013 (Central Bank of Kenya 2013, p. 15). “The number of banks conducting agency 
banking increased to 13 as at December 2013 from 10 commercial banks in December 2012. In 
addition, the number of approved agents increased by 7,144 to 23,477 as at the end of December 
2013. This represents a 44% increase in the number of licensed agents, albeit the concentration of 
92% of the agents in 3 large banks. The number of transactions increased by 40% from 29,937,112 
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transactions recorded in 2012 to 42,055,854 transactions in 2013” (Central Bank of Kenya 2013, p. 
16).  
Finally, AMFI were successful in calling for an amendment to section 14(1) of the Microfinance Act to 
allow microfinance banks to issue third party cheques, open current accounts and engage in foreign 
trade operations. This will enable microfinance banks to participate in the National Payment System 
(NPS)8. 
While new governance has been essential it has been observed that “The regulatory requirements to 
make this transition and to maintain a license as a deposit-taking institution are very stringent and 
include continuous evaluation of the qualifications of management and the Board of Directors. As 
most participating MFIs began as non-profit organisations or non-profit programmes, this 
transformation represents a major shift from a relatively informal type of organisational structure, to 
a highly regulated institution and trustee of public deposits” (FSD Kenya 2010a, pp. 4-5). Interviews 
at the CBK confirmed that such restructuring was one of the biggest challenges for many MFIs. 
 
Regulation of SACCOS 
Regulation of the rapidly growing SACCOs sector could not be adequately addressed within the 
provisions of the Cooperatives Societies Act (CSA) CAP 490, despite numerous amendments (SASRA 
2011, p. 32). The Ministry of Cooperative Development and Marketing (MoCDM) promulgated the 
SACCO Societies Act (SSA) in 2008 providing for the licensing, supervision and regulation of SACCO 
Societies (SASRA 2011, p. 32). The Act also establishes the Deposit Guarantee Fund (DGF) which 
provides protection to members’ deposits up to KSh.100, 000 per member. The SSA commenced in 
2009. The body responsible for the implementation of this regulatory framework is the SACCO 
Society Regulatory Authority (SASRA), a semi-autonomous government Agency under the Ministry of 
Industrialization and Enterprise Development (SASRA 2014), a creation of the SACCO Societies Act 
2008, inaugurated in 2009, which started operations in June 2010 upon publication of the SACCO 
Societies (Deposit Taking SACCO Business) Regulations. The SSA defines requirements for SACCOs in 
the areas of capital adequacy, asset quality, liquidity, restrictions on non-core business activities 
(SASRA 2012, p. 15). Section 69 of the SSA (2008) provided one year from the date of publication of 
the Regulations (2010) for all the Deposit Taking (FOSA operating) SACCOs to apply for a license 
(SASRA 2012, p. 33). This period lapsed in June 2011 by which date 200 SACCO societies had 
submitted their applications for license with SASRA (SASRA 2012, p. 33). The balance of eighteen 
(18) SACCO societies discontinued or closed the Deposit Taking SACCO business as they did not 
satisfy the licensing requirements: reverted to the operations the Back Office Service Activity (BOSA) 
referred to in the Act as non-Deposit Taking SACCO (SASRA 2012, p. 33). Fifteen SACCOs applied to 
commence Deposit Taking operations during the year bringing the total license applications to 215 
by the end of 2011 (SASRA 2012, p. 33). By the end of 2012, 124 were licenced (SASRA 2012, p. 33). 
A four years transitional period for DTS to become licensed and fully comply with the prudential 
requirements runs until June 2014 (SASRA 2012, p. 15).  
Membership of SACCOs has risen because the SACCO Societies Act prohibits SACCOs from 
transacting with non-members in line with the principles of cooperatives and the cooperative law, 
and therefore, new customers are technically made members although with less rights (SASRA 2010, 
p. 15). 
                                                          
8
 The NPS provides systems to clear payments (cheques, electronic payment and payment cards) between 
banks, but also encompasses the total payment process.  
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Status 
Microcredit 
Providers 
Registration Regulation 
In
fo
rm
al
 
Money Lenders 
No registration of any type 
No specific regulatory framework, 
reliant on general financial and 
contractual legal frameworks 
where recourse is made by either 
lenders of borrowers 
Family and 
Friends 
Shopkeepers 
Potentially registered, but most 
likely unregistered businesses 
Rotating Savings 
and Credit 
Associations 
(ROSCAs) and 
Accumulating 
Savings and 
Credit 
Associations 
(ASCAs) 
Encouraged to be registered with 
Ministry of Social Security, but 
some might remain unregistered. 
Q
u
as
i-
Fo
rm
al
 
Fo
rm
al
 
Su
b
si
d
is
e
d
 Non Deposit 
Taking / Credit-
Only 
Microfinance 
Institution 
Registered as a range of legal 
forms 
Regulations for Non Deposit 
Taking Microfinance Institutions 
are yet to be put in place. The 
Ministry of Finance is in the 
process of discussing the best way 
forward for regulating the non-
deposit taking microfinance 
businesses 
N
o
n
-S
u
b
si
d
is
ed
 m
ic
ro
fi
n
an
ce
 
Commercial 
Banks 
Must be registered under the 
Banking Act (2014) 
Banking Regulations and 
Prudential Guidelines 
(off-site and on-site surveillance) 
Deposit Taking 
Microfinance 
Institutions 
Must be registered under the 
Microfinance Act (2008) 
Microfinance Regulations 
SACCOS 
Register 
under the 
Cooperativ
e Societies 
Act (1997) 
Deposit 
Taking 
SACCOs 
Register 
under 
SACCO 
Societie
s Act of 
2008 
SACCO Societies Regulatory 
Authority (SASRA) 
Non-Deposit Taking 
SACCOs 
 
Supervised by Commissioner for 
Co-operatives 
Consumer 
Credit Providers 
Registered under the 
Corporations Act 
Consumer Protection Act (2012) 
Table 17: Current Regulatory Framework for Principle Microcredit Activities 2006 
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Performance of Microfinance in Kenya 
 
Outreach 
Unfortunately, due to a lack of publicly available statistical information specifically about 
microfinance, it is difficult to provide an accurate account of outreach. Replying on AMFI 
membership as an indicative sample, as of December 2012, members were reaching 832,794 active 
borrowers with a gross loan portfolio of KSHS 49.1bn, achieving a 15.7% annual growth (AMFI 
2013b, p. 7). Thes growth of the microcredit sector contributes to the independent observation9 that 
“Kenya’s financial landscape has considerably changed over the period 2006-2013” (Central Bank of 
Kenya 2013, p. 13).  
Looking at financial inclusion more broadly the Financial Access Survey of 2013 reports that:  
 32.7% of the adult population has access to formal financial services (15.0% in 2006 and 
22.1% in 2009) and the proportion of the population using informal financial services 
declined to 7.8% in 2013 from 33.3% in 2006. 
 Part of the reason for this was the population accessing Formal, non-prudential (e.g. mobile 
phone providers) prudentially regulated (Banks, DT-S and DT-MFIs) financial services 
increased significantly: from 15% and 4.3% respectively in 2006, to 22.1% and 15% in 2009 
and 32.7% and 33.2% by 2013. 
However despite the increases in the percentages of the population accessing services likely to be 
made available through microfinance providers, 25.4% of the adult population has remained 
financially excluded (39.3% in 2006, 33% in 2009). Furthermore, in 2013 it was reported that 25% of 
the population surveyed “use only family, friends, neighbours and secret places to save or borrow” 
(FSD Kenya 2014b, p. 1).  
                                                          
9
 Financial inclusion in Kenya has been tracking through three nationally representative financial access 
surveys undertaken in 2006, 2009 and 2013 dubbed ‘FinAccess’. 
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Figure 1: Changes in Access to Financial Services 2006-2009 (FSD Kenya No Date, p. 6). 
Between 2006 and 2009, there was a modest expansion in overall usage of informal and quasi-
formal credit, from 37.5% to 38.7% of the population (FSD Kenya No Date, p. 6). However there was 
a significant reduction in the proportion of people depending only on informal services (from 32.4% 
to 26.8%). To a great extent, this has been attributed to the introduction of M-PESA services in the 
country, which make credit available through mobile phones and therefore allow the expansion of 
services without investment in a physical presence by credit providers (see the section on Mobile 
Banking on page 39). 
According to analysis in 2010, microfinance has not grown to the extent seen in many other 
countries for several reasons; although this is also true of east Africa in general. One of the 
challenges is the insufficient population density in many parts of the country, as MFIs are not 
incentivised to serve sparsely populated areas (FSD Kenya 2010a). Another issue was that while most 
MFI CEOs are effective operational managers, many lack the skills and training necessary to be 
strategic leaders (FSD Kenya 2010a, p. 4).  
Sustainability of MF 
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As of December 2012, the portfolio quality held by AMFI members was described as “fair” (AMFI 
2013a, p. 13). The Portfolio at Risk (PAR) over 30 days was 9% for the sector overall and 7% when 
banks are excluded. While the Banks’ performance is not as good as the average, Credit Only MFIs 
surprisingly show a portfolio quality better than average (AMFI 2013a, p. 13). Over time, while 
credit-only institutions have been slowly improving, banks and DTM improved 2010-2011 but then 
worsened slightly in 2011-2012. As can be seen in Graph 1, PAR declined overtime for all institutions 
in 2012, although it remain highest for banks who remain with 5% PAR even after a year. Write off 
ratio remained below 1% for the sector without banks over the period of analysis and for the whole 
sector in 2010 and 2012 (AMFI 2013a, p. 13). 
Portfolio quality among all AMFI members was weakest for Emergency loans; while Portfolio At Risk 
over 30 days (PAR 30) in the sector, without banks, was concentrated around credit made available 
for Asset Finance Loans (AMFI 2013a, p. 14). Group lending methodology reports a better portfolio 
quality than individual lending (AMFI 2013a, p. 14). PAR 30 is highest in Nairobi and Coast province 
considering the whole sector and the sector without banks respectively. Portfolio quality is the best 
in Central, North Eastern, Nyanza and Rift Valley provinces, both including and excluding banks. This 
suggests that, as is usually the case, microcredit repayment is more difficult to enforce in urbanised 
areas as compared to rural areas. 
Although less detailed information is available, SACCOS have been reducing the number of non-
performing loans on their books: as can be seen in Table 18. 
Year Value of Non-performing Loans Percentage of Non-performing Loans 
2010 Data UA 
2011 12,185,308,345 9.6% 
2012 11,540,001,024 7.3% 
Graph 1: Portfolio at Risk Aging Profile (AMFI 2013a, p. 13) 
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2013 Report not available 
Table 18: Non-Performing Loans by Licenced SACCOs (SASRA 2012) 
 
 
Issues with Microfinance Identified by the Existing Literature 
 
Microcredit is not enough 
The poor need other support in addition to the credit that is required to facilitate livelihood 
investments. Within the sphere of business development , it is necessary to facilitate exposure to 1) 
successful role models and 2) ideas and technologies (FSD Kenya 2014a, p. 15). In some places, 
individuals or communities have little knowledge of the extent to which successful enterprise can 
change their standard of living. Particularly remote populations lack any knowledge that their 
livelihoods can change and believe that wealthy households have always been so. Given that 
communities often only have trading as an example of how money might be made, isolated 
communities often remain unaware of, or unexposed to, technology that might support alternative 
livelihood options (FSD Kenya 2014a, p. 15). Where entrepreneurial thinking does exist, business 
people need other financial services in addition to credit. However, much less work has been done 
to provide micro-insurance, micro-pensions and micro-leasing products and services (Dondo No 
Date, p. 9). It should be born in mind however, that providers of finance might not be the best 
institution through which wider enterprise skills should be built. Moreover, the sustainable 
livelihoods framework well identifies that finance is only one, and often the least important, element 
of sustainable livelihoods: with social, human, physical and environmental capital often being more 
relevant (Hussein and Nelson 1998). 
Access to Microcredit is Geographically Concentrated 
Although rural financial inclusion has improved, there has traditionally been a bias in the physical 
geography of microfinance and credit availability. In 2004 it was reported that “The majority of the 
MF programmes are concentrated in Nairobi, the Mt. Kenya region and Western region of the 
country.  Generally, most of the programmes operate in urban areas with very few penetrating deep 
in rural areas.  There are very few programs in the arid and semi-arid areas of the country, which 
comprise of two-thirds of Kenyan landmass” (Dondo No Date, p. 9). Unfortunately, it is difficult to 
ascertain to what extent this situation has changed by 2014. AMFI have provided the map of 
distribution show in 
Figure 2, which highlights a continued concentration of services around the primary urban areas, 
although suggests some penetration across the whole country – even those areas not directly 
included in the map. It should be noted that this distribution relates closely to the population 
density of the country. 
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Figure 2: Map of Microfinance Distribution in Kenya (AMFI 2013a, p. 70) 
 
Interest Rates Remain High 
It has long been understood that the availability of credit is not sufficient to promote appropriate 
use, and that both transaction and interest costs are considered in the decision to access credit 
(Kariuki 1995). Formal Banks have stronger power in the market to provide lower interest rates as 
they source 67% of capital from savings and only 11% from loans; as compared to DTMs who borrow 
34% of their lending capital and raise 43% in deposits, and Credit Only MFIs who primarily fund 
operations from borrowings (AMFI 2013a). It might in theory be possible for lending institutions to 
source cheaper external credit, which could be make available cheaper than paying transaction costs 
of consumer deposits, but this has not been the case. 
 
Adjustment to New Licensing Slow 
 
Requirements of new regulation and graduation to DT-MFIs requires significant change for many 
organisations. In many cases the adjustments required in the ownership structure of MFIs have been 
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slow and therefore, prevented formalisation. It is also it is essential that both the management 
teams and Board of Directors evolve accordingly and have the appropriate expertise. “The Boards of 
many participating MFIs are not comprised of members with the appropriate knowledge and/or 
experience to meet these regulatory standards. The structure and operations of an MFI become 
more sophisticated as it makes the transition from a non-profit or non-regulated institution to a fully 
regulated financial institution” (FSD Kenya 2010a, p. 10).  
 
Consumer Protection and Over-Indebtedness 
Despite the development of Credit Agencies – which facilitate the sharing of individual credit 
histories for clients and potential clients – there remains the risk of client over indebtedness in 
contexts where microcredit is highly accessible. One specific reason for this is that Credit Only MFIs 
and SACCOs were not included in mainstream credit information sharing as of 2013, and this has 
reduced the effectiveness of this mechanism (AMFI 2013a). Furthermore, credit information can be 
used by institutions differently, and in theory there can be discrepancies between the use of 
individual credit histories to 1) protect the interests of the lender and 2) protect the interests of the 
consumer. 
 
 
Consumer Protection in the Microfinance Sector 
In 2001, the Kenya Bankers Association, which primarily serves as a lobby for the banks’ 
interests,  published the A Consumer Guide to Banking in Kenya (Kenya Bankers Association 2001). 
However, according to the centre for financial inclusion, in 2008, “Political stagnation between the 
country’s power-brokering fractions has prevented the government from taking action on consumer 
protection policies. The status of client protection in Kenya is very weak due to little or no action 
taken by government, non-government, and banking entities. There has been action against 
corruption, with a commission passing a general code of conduct for co-operative societies, but the 
code is vague and falls short of creating a consumer protection framework. No actions on consumer 
protection by the banking networks have been made public to date” (CFI 2009). 
A general consumer protection bill was introduced in July 2007 and AMFI included the creation of a 
code of standards into their strategy for 2007-2010 (CFI 2009). In 2007 and 2008, the CBK produced 
four biannual communication of bank charges, interest rates and lending rates for all banks as a 
means of promoting market discipline and competition among the players (Central Bank of Kenya 
2014a). However, this activity was not continued. 
The Microfinance Act (2008) did include some consumer protection legislation, although this was 
very limited in nature. The Act required: 
 Institutions shall not provide ‘reckless credit’, although this is described as being constituted by 
lending “detrimental to the institution interest or the interest of depositors or the general 
public” with specific mention of actions that transgress “limits set under the Act or Central Bank 
of Kenya”, are ‘contrary to any guidelines or regulations issued by the Central Bank Act’, ‘failing 
to observe the institution’s policies as approved by the board of directors’ or involve the ‘misuse 
of position or facilities of the institution for personal gain’. There is however, no specific mention 
of limitations designed to protect the interests of those taking out credit with an organisation. 
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 Proper identification of customers and managers, with full disclosure as to who is controlling 
nominee accounts. This measure was designed in order to protect consumers from falling prey 
to fraudulent schemes; although there is no mention of the way such a measure might be used 
to conjunction with credit reference agencies to prevent over borrowing. 
 
The new Kenya constitution also has specific provisions on consumer rights. “This agenda has grown 
out of concerns related to expansion of regulated financial services to large numbers of first-time 
retail consumers, the large spread between lending and deposit rates, the exposure of consumers to 
substantial losses through pyramid schemes, the introduction of increasingly complex financial 
products and the blurring of lines between types of financial service providers” (FSD Kenya 2011, p. 
1). This is an important area as the FinAccess survey of 2009 identified that: 
“Not all users received a written loan agreement. While this is expected from informal lenders, only 
93% of bank borrowers and 95% of SACCO borrowers said they had received a written agreement. 
Of those that did receive one, most but not all were able to take it away to study it before signing. 
However, many were still pressured to sign the agreement immediately, even in formal institutions 
such as banks (10%), MFIs (10%), SACCOs (14%) and hire purchase (10%). Those who had taken a 
loan or credit often were required to offer some type of collateral. In 42% of cases, this involved the 
rights to a home or other asset; in 45%, this involved someone signing surety (i.e., providing a 
guarantee); and in 7%, the lender withheld the borrower’s ATM card and pin number, which is a 
highly improper lending practice that warrants further investigation… Practically speaking…, many 
respondents still find…it difficult to completely understand loan documents and many [6-9%] were 
surprised by how much is actually charged for loans… after taking out a loan” (FSD Kenya 2011, p. 3). 
However, until 2012, Kenya did not have a specific law that governs consumer protection. The 
Consumer Protection Act created the Kenya Consumers Protection Advisory (CPA) Committee, to aid 
in the formulation of policy related to consumer protection, accredit consumer organisations, advise 
consumers on their rights and responsibilities, investigate complaints and establish conflict 
resolution mechanisms amongst other duties. In terms of credit, the Act (Coulson Harney 2012):  
 Prevents lenders rejecting clients use of third party insurers unless on reasonable grounds.  
 Prevents lenders applying default charges other than 1) the legal costs incurred to collect 
payment, realising a security interest or protecting the subject matter of the security interest or 
2) reasonable charges incurred due to a payment instruction issued by the borrower being 
dishonoured 
 Prevents the application of early repayment penalties 
 Requires a lender to provide an initial disclosure statement for a credit agreement, prior to the 
borrower entering into the credit agreement 
 Requiring 12-monthly disclosure statements for credit based on a floating rate and monthly for 
open credit 
 
Credit Information 
July 2010 saw the launch of the Credit Information Sharing (CIS) mechanism (Central Bank of Kenya 
2013, p. 35). Since then, and as of 31st December 2013, a total of 3.5 million and 55,094 credit 
reports had been requested from the two licensed Credit Reference Bureaus (CRBs). The credit 
reports requested by banks increased by 25.6 percent from 2012 to 2013. In 2013 there was a 
revision of the Credit Reference Bureau Regulations to incorporate amendments to the Banking Act 
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and the Microfinance Act, which allowed Commercial Banks and Microfinance Banks to share both 
positive and negative (full file) credit information and enhance the robustness of the existing CIS 
framework. The full file information sharing requirement took effect in 2014 (Central Bank of Kenya 
2013, p. 35). It was believed by the Central Bank that “This will go a long way in providing a holistic 
assessment of an individual’s or entity’s credit history and credit worthiness which will in turn enable 
providers of credit to make accurate and credible decisions when determining credit applications” 
(Central Bank of Kenya 2013, p. 37).  
 
Mobile Banking 
Throughout the 1990s, big banks expanded their networks of Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) 
while the small and medium size banks explored the possibility of establishing shared ATMs (Central 
Bank of Kenya 1999, p. 8). The use of credit, debit and charge cards also expanded (Central Bank of 
Kenya 1999, p. 8). Towards the end of the 1990s, several banks began to offer internet banking and 
established websites. At this stage, a major constraint on further technology related products was 
reportedly “the lack of modernisation in telecommunications sector” (Central Bank of Kenya 1999, p. 
8). However, over time there has been increased convergence of banking and mobile phone 
platforms as banks  explored more convenient and cost effective channels of providing financial 
services (Central Bank of Kenya 2013, p. 11).  
One of the key regulatory moves was the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector in 1999 
(Central Bank of Kenya 1999, p. 8). The newly created Communications Commission of Kenya issued 
the mobile licenses in 2000 to two Mobile Network Operators (MNOs): Safaricom, a 60/40 percent 
joint venture between the government-owned Telkom Kenya and Britain's Vodafone; and Celtel, a 
subsidiary of Africa's third-ranked phone company. By the end March 2008 there were 11,986,007 
subscribers representing a penetration of 35.25% (CCK 2008b, p. 2). Later in 2008 Telkom sold shares 
in Safaricom and partnered with the Orange Group to launch Orange Kenya; Celtel is now owned by 
Bharti Airtel (2010) and trades as Airtel; while YuMobile, also launched in 2008 by the African 
telecommunications company, Econet. In March 2014 however, YuMobile was bought by Safaricom 
and Airtel (Mulligan 2014). As a result of the development of this infrastructure and subsequent 
growth in mobile phone coverage and usage (see  Table 19 and Table 20), the opportunities for 
mobile banking have been well established.  
Period 
Mobile 
Subscriptions 
Mobile 
Penetration (per 
100 people) 
Mobile 
Money 
Subscriptions 
No. of Mobile 
Money 
Agents 
Total Deposits 
(KSH) 
2007/08 11,986,007 35 UA UA UA 
2008/09 17,362,357 46 UA UA UA 
2009/10 20,119,304 51 UA UA UA 
2010/11 25,279,768 64.2 17,395,727 42,313 486,846,424,518 
2011/12 29,703,439 75 19,505,702 49,079 672,300,539,552 
2012/13 30,549,422 77 24,840,404 88,466 UA 
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June 2014 32,300,000 79.2 26,600,000 109,286 UA 
 Table 19: Growth in Mobile and Mobile Money in Kenya (CCK 2008a, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014a) 
In 2004, The Co-operative Bank claimed that it “leads the market by pioneering mobile banking in 
Kenya, by launching M-Banking, a banking service delivered via mobile phones. M-Banking enables 
customers to access their bank accounts and carry out various transactions that include getting bank 
balances, registering for salary alerts and loading airtime on cell phones, among others” (Co-
Operative Bank 2014). In 2006 the Bank launched SACCO Link: an IT system that integrated the 
banking systems of SACCOs with those of the Co-operative Bank, to enable members of SACCOs to 
access banking services from the service outlets of the Bank (Co-Operative Bank 2014). 
However, the telecommunications organisation which has had the most impact on mobile banking in 
Kenya is Safaricom. This was originally a department within the Kenya Posts & Telecommunications 
Corporation, which held a monopoly over the telecommunications sector. Safaricom started 
operation in 1993 before being incorporated on 3 April 1999 as Safaricom Limited under the 
Companies Act as a private limited liability company (Safaricom 2014b). The company was converted 
into a public company on 16 May 2002 due to a 60% shareholding by the state corporation Telkom 
Kenya Limited (“TKL”) (Safaricom 2014b). However, in 2008, 25% of the state ownership was sold to 
the public neutralising its status as a public company. Safaricom has subsequently become the most 
successful mobile phone provider in Kenya. According to statistics published by the Communication 
Commission of Kenya in 2014, mobile penetration in Kenya currently stands at 79.2 percent, with 
Safaricom recording the largest subscriber share of 68% per cent (CCK 2014a, p. 8). 
 
Network Subscribers (December 2013) Percentage 
Safaricom 21.2 million 73.2 
Airtel 5.1 million 14.3 
YuMobile 2.6 million 7.3 
Orange (kenya) 2.2 million 5.2 
Total 31.3 million 100% 
Table 20: Mobile subscriptions in Kenya (CCK 2014b) 
In 2007 Safaricom launched M-Pesa. Originally intended as a micro savings product, M-PESA 
developed into a peer-to-peer mobile-phone based money transfer service for people who have 
access to a mobile phone, but no or  only limited access to a bank (Standard Digital Reporter 2014). 
The services provided by this and other mobile money system are summarised in Table 21). By the 
first of November 2007, there were just over 1 million active M-Pesa users: 2 million by March 2008, 
3 million by July 2008, 10 million June 2011, 15 million April 2012, 17 million February 2013 
(Safaricom 2014a) and 18.1 million in 2014 (Standard Digital Reporter 2014). This means that M-
PESA commands more than one third of all mobile money transactions in the world (Standard Digital 
Reporter 2014). The introduction of M-PESA has had a profound impact on financial inclusion in 
Kenya. Between 2005 and 2010 there was a large jump in total formal inclusion (formal + other 
formal) from 26.3% to 40.5%, and this was “largely driven by the introduction of the M-PESA mobile 
phone based payments system” (FSD Kenya No Date, p. 5). However, coverage by the company is 
geographically limited and large, particularly rural, areas of Kenya remain unserved by Safaricom 
(FSD Kenya 2010b, p. 4).  
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A number of factors have facilitated this growth. Firstly has been the network of agents that 
facilitate the conversation of physical cash and mobile money, working on behalf of financial service 
providers but not directly for them (Central Bank of Kenya 2013, p. 11). When regulatory reform 
allowed agent banking the agent network was built from their existing airtime distribution (FSD 
Kenya 2010b, p. 5). In addition, the use of aggregator agents, who oversee multiple outlets, allowed 
Safaricom and others, very quickly to increase the number of agents by signing agreements with a 
limited number of retailers (FSD Kenya 2010b, p. 5). Aggregated agents also improved cash 
management, balancing cash float issues between their different outlets caused by regional 
imbalances between deposits and withdrawals (FSD Kenya 2010b, p. 5). There are estimated to be 
more than 93,000 mobile money agents in Kenya, according to the Communications Commission of 
Kenya, and 26 million mobile money subscribers across the four mobile network operators in Kenya 
(Kamau 2014). Safaricom has a substantial chunk of the agents (81,025). Furthermore, Safaricom has 
developed strategic partnerships with large companies who accept M-Pesa for bill payment: for 
example Qatar Airways customers can now book tickets online or through the reservations office 
and make their payment through M-PESA (Standard Digital Reporter 2014). Behind these factors it is 
also relevant that the “level of financial literacy in Kenya may have eased adoption of M-PESA” (FSD 
Kenya 2010b, p. 2). It took more than two years before the service broke even in the beginning of 
2009 (FSD Kenya 2010b, p. 3). 
In addition the M-Pesa money transfer system, Safaricom previously partnered with Equity Bank on 
M-Kesho, a banking and savings service. Although this proved to unsuccessful due to complications 
over revenue sharing between the stakeholders, the idea of linking mobiles to formal banking 
services has also taken off. Following the initial failure, Safaricom then partnered with Commercial 
Bank of Africa (CBA) to launch a similar product branded as M-Shwari at the end of 2012. The system 
offers a micro savings and lending facility and signed up 7 million subscribers who transacted more 
than KShs 156 bn. The move led to a growth in CBA’s loan accounts by more than 800%, from 89,000 
in 2012 to 897,000 in December 2013, therefore total loans of KShs 13 bn. 2012-2014 (BiztechAfrica 
2014). On this basis, CBA claimed to have overtaken Equity Bank as the lender with the highest 
number of retail loans (Heinrich 2014). For the year ended March 31, 2014, Safaricom posted 
KSh144.7 bn gross profit, KShs 26.6 bn of which came from M-PESA earnings. 
Safaricom is not the only network provider to offer mobile money services, and all companies now 
provide such options. These are summarised in Table 21: 
System 
Brand 
Mobile 
Network 
Operator 
Bank Services 
YuCash YuMobile 
Equity Bank 
& Co-
operative 
Bank 
Move funds directly between YuCash and partner bank 
accounts 
Send & receive money to/from other mobile numbers 
Request money from other users 
Top up airtime from YuCash account 
View YuCash balance and statement 
Deposit and withdraw YuCash via YuCash agents and banks 
Withdraw funds from Equity ATMs without a card 
Pay utility bills 
M-PESA 
(2008) & 
M-Shwari 
Safaricom 
Commercial 
Bank of 
Africa (CBA) 
Move funds between M-Shwari savings account and phone 
Send & receive money to/from other mobile numbers 
Top up airtime from M-PESA account 
42 
 
(2012) View M-PESA balance and statement 
View M-Shwari balance and mini-statement 
Deposit and withdraw M-PESA via agents and banks 
Pay utility bills 
Withdraw funds from Equity ATMs without a card 
Transfer money to M-PESA pre-pay VISA Card 
Access micro credit product (minimum of KSh.100 any time) 
Airtel-
Money 
(2011) 
Previously 
Zap 
Airtel 
Equity Bank 
Co-operative 
Bank 
Equatorial 
Commercial 
Bank 
Standard 
Chartered 
Bank 
Move funds between bank and phone 
Send & receive money to/from other mobile numbers 
Top up airtime from 
Access Equity account balance and statement 
Send and receive money to/from other Airtel users 
Deposit and withdraw money via agents and Axis Banks 
Withdraw money from ATMS 
Pay utility bills 
Spend and withdraw using Airtel Money debit card directly 
from Airtel account 
Faulu 
Microfinance 
Access to microcredit product 
Orange 
Money 
(2010) 
Orange 
Kenya 
Equity Bank 
“Mapped bank account”: the phone is used to access a 
bank account held with Equity Bank 
Move funds directly between Orange Money and Equity 
Bank accounts 
Send & receive money to/from other mobile numbers 
Top up airtime from Orange Money account 
View Orange Money balance and statement 
Deposit and withdraw Orange Money via Orange agents 
and Equity banks 
Withdraw funds from Equity ATMs without a card 
Pay utility bills 
Spend and withdraw using Orange Money debit card 
directly from Orange Money account 
Repay loans from Equity Bank 
Undertake loan applications through agents 
Table 21: Mobile Money Services in Kenya (2014) Compiled from analysis of the websites and 
literature from the respective companies. 
As can be seen above the network providers offer a range of microcredit products. Although the M-
PESA system began as a means to disburse and repay loans offered by the MFI Faulu, it was 
converted into a money transfer system during the trials (Mbuvi 2012). Attempts to offer credit 
services in partnership with Equity Bank then failed. Therefore, the first phone based credit facility 
to enter the market came from the partnership between Faulu and Airtel launched in April 2012 
(Microcapital 2014a). Mobile money subscribers apply for and access to short-term micro loans 
(between KShs 100 to KShs 10,000, repayable in 10 days) from via their phones from the 'Faulu Airtel 
kopa chapaa' service (Mbuvi 2012). Access to loans requires being a customer Airtel for at least six 
months and to have made more than 2 transactions on the service (Mbuvi 2012). Interest rates rise 
if the loan is rolled over beyond the first 10 day period and Airtel will refer defaulters to the Credit 
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Reference Bureau (Mbuvi 2012). Kopa Kredo – Kenya, offers Airtels’ customers (for more than 3 
months) credit for airtime top-ups, which they repay next time they top up with credit, plus a service 
fee of 10% (CFI 2009). Also in January 2014, Airtel Kenya announced a new loans product in 
partnership with a Mauritius-based consumer credit firm AFB (FSD Kenya No Date). It was suggested 
that loans would be offered to customers without security, but using savings, airtime consumption 
patterns and use of Airtel’s money transfer service as the tools of credit appraisal (FSD Kenya No 
Date). 
Safaricom offers microloans through the M-Shwari system. These small loans do not technically carry 
interest but incur a 7.5% facilitation fee payable only once for each loan taken (JUMA 2012). The 
loan is payable within 30 days but If the loan is repaid in less, a customer’s loan limit qualification 
will increase (JUMA 2012). If the loan is not repaid, another 7.5% charge is added for another 30 
days (JUMA 2012). Defaulters have their details forwarded to Kenya’s Credit Reference Bureau 
(JUMA 2012). By early 2014 the service had registered $2.35 million in daily deposits from six million 
users, resulting in customer savings of over KShs 24 billion and KShs 7.8 billion loaned to users at an 
average disbursement rate of 30,000 loans per day (Okutoyi 2014a). By the same time, 140,000 
clients had defaulted on their loans worth KShs 241 million, or 3.1% of loans which is lower than 
defaults after 360 days from banks (Okutoyi 2014a).  
Orange offers access to credit from Equity Bank via applications made through their agents. Equity 
Bank also offer current customers, or those signing up for an account, credit to buy organise 
hardware products such as phone and computers (IT News Africa 2010).  
Family Bank in Kenya, announced the PESA MOB loans in December 2013, which was to be 
accessible across several mobile networks in Kenya and provide a full suite of banking services 
including microcredit (Presse 2013). However, the service does not yet appear to be available. 
In addition to the microfinance services offered by the network companies, other private lending 
firms offer microloans through mobile phones. In 2012, VL Capital and Flexus Systems launched the 
second phone based microcredit facility into the market, Pesa na Pesa. Following registration, clients 
can access credit via an SMS request, which initially must be repaid in a maximum of seven days 
(Mbugua 2012). Interest rates will range from seven to 10 per cent (Mbugua 2012). A maturing 
cheque, an upcoming salary or a chama merry-go-round or loan is required as collateral. M-Pepea 
launched in May 2012 to provide instant loans to workers at a fee via their mobile phones (Sangare 
2012). To be eligible, employees and their employer register for the service and then borrowers can 
request loans by sending an SMS to M-Pepea. The system will automatically send a request to M-
Pepea to credit the borrower’s number with the specified amount depending on their contract. The 
loan is repaid incrementally from the borrower’s salary at an interest rate ranging between 10 to 
15% (Sangare 2012). 
In addition to mobile money services offered by other Mobile Network Provider, the 
Communications Authority of Kenya, granted Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) licenses to 
three new mobile money transfer services in April 2014: Finserve Africa Limited, Zioncell Kenya 
Limited, and Tangaza Mobile Pay Limited (Heinrich 2014; Microcapital 2014b). The three firms will 
provide services via the network of the Kenyan subsidiary of Indian telecommunications firm, Bharti, 
Airtel. Airtel Kenya was launched in 2000 as Kencell, rebranded to Zain in 2008 and finally Airtel in 
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2010. The introduction of new MVNOs10 was expected to encourage greater competition in the 
mobile money sector, and there is some indication of this possibility. Equity Bank is the parent 
company of Finserve Africa. In June 2013 the bank announced a new cashless payment card system 
called BebaPay, which is expected to enable users to pay bus fares without the use of cash 
(Microcapital 2013). In addition Finserve Africa was expected to launch its new SIM cards linked 
directly to bank accounts in July 2014, therefore allowing its customers to access their accounts and 
apply for loans via their mobile phones (Centre for Financial Inclusion 2009). 
More specialised mobile based financial services are also being developed. CARE International, 
Kenya’s Equity Bank, and French telecommunications operator Orange partnered to provide CARE’s 
village savings and loan associations (VSLAs) with the facilities to make deposits and withdrawals at 
Equity Bank and with Orange agents’ (Microcapital 2012). At the beginning of 2012, 25 Kenyan 
savings groups had enrolled in the program with 175 saving groups scheduled to start in September 
2012 (Microcapital 2012).  
 
Limitations and Issues with Mobile Technology 
 
There are consumer protection concerns associated with the mobile money sector. A report from 
CGAP investigating the opportunity for social cash transfer payments, including Cash for Assets (CFA) 
in Kenya, highlighted the possibility for loss due to agent or staff misconduct; lack of transparency 
and disclosure of terms and fees; lack of adequate or effective avenues for recourse and redress, 
and; data privacy and protection challenges (Zimmerman et al. 2014). However, focusing on M-Pesa 
services it was found that users “were very clear about what to do when problems arose and 
overwhelmingly stated that problems were resolved quickly when reported. Participants were even 
able to recite the telephone number of customer care at M-Pesa, and many respondents noted that 
even when money was sent to the wrong person, it was often easy to recover the money” (FSD 
Kenya 2011, p. 4). 
In remote areas, the electronic transfer of funds into the community, such as under trials of 
electronic social support payments, has the potential to lead to a lack of physical money by agents as 
recipients crowd to withdraw funds (Zimmerman et al. 2014). Indeed, in a FinAccess survey in 2011 
“22% have had a problem when there was no cash at the agent” (FSD Kenya 2011, p. 4). 
Despite efforts to facilitate competition in the mobile money sector, Safaricom still dominates. 
Indeed, M-PESA commands more than one third of all mobile money transactions in the world 
(Standard Digital Reporter 2014). This dominance was for a long time reinforced through the terms 
and conditions of their agents’ employment: as they were prevented from also selling the services of 
other operators under threat of losing their processing equipment (Kamau 2014). However, in 
February 2014, and ahead of a ruling in response to a petition submitted by Airtel for the restriction 
to lifted by the courts, Safaricom removed all exclusivity provisions in from M-Pesa agent contracts 
(Okutoyi 2014b).  
Additionally, the new ‘thin SIM’ technology announced by Equity Bank’s is designed to break 
Safaricom’s dominance. The is a thin layer of plastic printed with a circuit that fits over existing card, 
                                                          
10
 A Mobile Virtual Network Operator is a wireless communications services provider that does not own the 
physical network over which it provides those services to customers. All three new MVNOs will be hosted by 
Airtel. 
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allowing continued access to the original network but with added functionality of the secondary 
provider (NYABIAGE and WERE 2014). This means that users will not need to migrate to another 
network to access different mobile money providers, as the Thin SIM can work alongside all four 
mobile operators in Kenya — Safaricom, Airtel, yuMobile and Orange (NYABIAGE and WERE 2014). 
The quality of agency banking serves is also potentially problematic. Agents surveyed in 2014 said 
unreliable service is also a major challenge, saying they experienced downtimes close to nine times 
per month (Kamau 2014). As a livelihood, working as a mobile money agent has limitations. 
According to a report which covered East Africa, Kenyan agents generate the highest number of 
transactions per agent, but the lowest amount of individual profits in the region (Kamau 2014). 
Kenyan agents earn a lower median profit per month ($70) than both Tanzania ($95) and Uganda 
($78) (Kamau 2014). It is reported that, “With new agents consistently joining the market, 
competition is having a negative impact on profits and driving existing agents in having to expand 
their business outside digital finance to supplement their income” (Kamau 2014). 
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